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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
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) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-2007-6123 
Petitioner! Appellant, 
Docket No. 36742 
vs. 
BONNEVILLE COUNTY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS, acting as Board of 
Adjustment, 
Respondent, 
And 
DALE AND MARLA MEYER, husband 
and wife, 
Applicants. 
------------------------------) 
************** 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
************** 
Appeal from the District Court of the 
Seventh Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
in and for the County of Bonneville 
HONORABLE Jon J. Shindurling, District Judge. 
Dale W. Storer 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & 
CRAPO 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0130 
Attorney for Appellant 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
Scott R. Hall 
NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER 
490 Memorial Drive 
P.O. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1630 
Attorney for Respondent 
Kipp L. Manwaring 
381 Shoup Avenue, Suite 21 0 
P.O. Box 50271 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0271 
Attorney for Applicants 
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icial District Court - Bonneville Cou 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2007-0006123 Current Judge: Jon J. Shindurling 
Stan Hawkins vs. Bonneville County Board Of Commissioners 
Stan Hawkins vs. Bonneville County Board Of Commissioners 
Date Code User 
11/1/2007 NCOC PHILLIPS New Case Filed-Other Claims 
NOAP PHILLIPS Plaintiff: Hawkins, Stan Notice Of Appearance 
Dale W. Storer 
PHILLIPS Filing: R2 - Appeals And Transfers For Judicial 
Review To The District Court Paid by: Storer, 
Dale W. (attorney for Hawkins, Stan) Receipt 
number: 0047131 Dated: 11/1/2007 Amount: 
$78.00 (Check) For: Hawkins, Stan (plaintiff) 
PETN PHILLIPS Petition for Judicial Review 
11/14/2007 DOOLITTL Statement of Issues on Judicial Review 
6/4/2008 DOOLITTL Request for Scheduling Order 
6/25/2008 HRSC KER Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference 
07/28/200809:15 AM) 
ORDR KER Scheduling Order for Record/Transcript and 
Notice of Hearing 
7/9/2008 DOOLITTL ****COPIES FOR TRANSCRIPTS BY T&T 
REPORTING******* 
7/29/2008 NOAP GWALTERS Defendant: Bonneville County Board Of 
Commissioners Notice Of Appearance Blake G. 
Hall 
NOAP GWALTERS Other party: Meyer, Dale W. Notice Of 
Appearance Kipp L. Manwaring 
NOAP GWALTERS Other party: Meyer, Marla L. Notice Of 
Appearance Kipp L. Manwaring 
MINE GWALTERS Minute Entry on Status Conference held on 
7/28/08 at 9: 15 AM. Opening brief is due 9/12/08, 
response is due 10/10/08, reply brief is due 
10/24/08. 
8/8/2008 DCHH GWALTERS Hearing result for Status Conference held on 
07/28/200809:15 AM: District Court Hearing Hel( 
Court Reporter: Nancy Marlow 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: under 100 
9/1512008 BRIF DOOLITTL Petitioner's Brief Filed 
10/10/2008 DOOLITTL Respondent Bonneville County Board of 
Commissioner's Response Brief 
11/3/2008 BRIF WILLIAMS Petitioner's Reply Brief 
11/10/2008 HRSC GWALTERS Hearing Scheduled (Motion 12/01/2008 11 :30 
AM) Oral Argument on Petition 
GWALTERS Notice of Hearing - Oral Argument on Petition 
set for 12/1/08 at 11 :30 AM 
12/1/2008 HRHD QUINTANA Hearing result for Motion held on 12/01/2008 
11:30AM: Hearing Held Oral Argument on 
Petition 
12/4/2008 MINE QUINTANA Minute Entry re Ptn review held on 12/1/08: This 
matter is taken under advisement and opinion will 
issue. (see doc for details). 
,.., .. 
User: MCGARY 
Judge 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shinduriing 
Jon J. Shindurling 
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Time: 09:16 AM ROA Report 
Page 2 of 3 Case: CV-2007-0006123 Current Judge: Jon J. Shindurling 
Stan Hawkins vs. Bonneville County Board Of Commissioners 
Stan Hawkins vs. Bonneville County Board Of Commissioners 
Date Code User 
2/2/2009 ORDR GWALTERS Opinion, Decision, and Order on Petitioners' Jon J. Shindurling 
Petition for Judicial Review: The Petition for 
Judicial Review of the Board's and Commission's 
decisions is DISMISSED. (see doc for details) 
CDIS GWALTERS Civil Disposition entered for: Bonneville County Jon J. Shindurling 
Board Of Commissioners, Defendant; Meyer, 
Dale W., Other Party; Meyer, Marla L., Other 
Party; Hawkins, Stan, Plaintiff. Filing date: 
2/2/2009 
STATUS GWALTERS Case Status Changed: Closed Jon J. Shindurling 
2/5/2009 HRSC GWALTERS Hearing Scheduled (Motion 03/09/2009 10:30 Jon J. Shindurling 
AM) Mtn to Reconsider - Hopkin to ntc 
STATUS GWALTERS Case Status Changed: Closed pending clerk Jon J. Shindurling 
action 
MOTN WILLIAMS Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration Jon J. Shindurling 
NOTH WILLIAMS Notice Of Hearing - 3/9/09 @ 10:30 a.m. Jon J. Shindurling 
2/10/2009 NOTH WOOLF Notice Of Hearing 3/09/2009 @ 10:30 AM Jon J. Shindurling 
AFFD WOOLF Affidavit of Blake G. Hall in Support of Jon J. Shindurling 
Respondent Bonneville County board of 
Commissioner's Motion for Attorney's Fees 
MEMO WOOLF Memorandum in Support of Respondent Jon J. Shindurling 
Bonneville County Board of Commissioner's 
Motion for Attorney's Fees 
MISC WOOLF Respondent Bonneville County Board of Jon J. Shindurling 
Commissioner's Motion for Attorney's Fees 
2/18/2009 WILLIAMS Petitioner's Objection to Bonneville County's Jon J. Shindurling 
Costs Memorandum 
2/27/2009 MOTN WOOLF Respondent's Objection to Petitioner's Motion for Jon J. Shindurling 
Reconsideration 
3/4/2009 RESP DOOLITTL Petitioner's Response to Respondent's Objection Jon J. Shindurling 
to Motion for Reconsideration 
3/9/2009 DCHH GWALTERS Hearing result for Motion held on 03/09/2009 Jon J. Shindurling 
10:30 AM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Nancy Marlow 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: under 100 Mtn to Reconsider - Hopkin 
to ntc; Mtn for atty fees - Anderson Hall to ntc 
3/11/2009 MINE GWALTERS Minute Entry on Mtn hrg held on 3/9/09 at 10:30 Jon J. Shindurling 
AM: Ct will issue a ruling after reviewing the 
briefs. (see doc for details). 
6/1/2009 ORDR GWALTERS Opinion, Decision & Order on Petitioners' Motion Jon J. Shindurling 
for Reconsideration: Petitioners' motion is 
DENIED (see doc for details). 
6/16/2009 HRSC GWALTERS Hearing Scheduled (Motion 07/14/2009 11 :00 Jon J. Shindurling 
AM) Mtn for atty fees - Angell to ntc 
6/23/2009 NOTH DOOLITIL Notice Of Hearing 7-14-09 @ 11:00 a.m. Jon J. Shindurling 
02 
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icial District Court - Bonneville 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2007-0006123 Current Judge: Jon J. Shindurling 
Stan Hawkins vs. Bonneville County Board Of Commissioners 
User: MCGARY 
Stan Hawkins vs. Bonneville County Board Of Commissioners 
Date Code User Judge 
6/23/2009 DOOLITTL Respondent Bonneville County Board of Jon J. Shindurling 
Commissioner's Motion for Attorney's Fees 
AFFD DOOLITTL Affidavit of Blake G. Hallin Support of Jon J. Shindurling 
Respondent Bonneville County Board of 
Commissioner's Motion for Attorney's Fees 
6/30/2009 KESTER Petitioner's Objection to Respondent's Motion for Jon J. Shindurling 
Attorney's Fees 
7/10/2009 BRIF KESTER Reply Brief in Support of Respondent Bonneville Jon J. Shindurling 
County Board of Commissioner's Motion for 
Attorney's Fees 
KESTER Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Jon J. Shindurling 
Supreme Court Paid by: Storer, Dale W. 
(attorney for Hawkins, Stan) Receipt number: 
0032415 Dated: 7/20/2009 Amount: $101.00 
(Check) For: Hawkins, Stan (plaintiff) 
NOTC KESTER Notice of Appeal Jon J. Shindurling 
7/14/2009 MINE GWALTERS Minute Entry Jon J. Shindurling 
Hearing type: Motion 
Hearing date: 7/14/2009 Time: 11 :05 am 
Court reporter: Nancy Marlow 
Minutes Clerk: Grace Walters 
DCHH GWALTERS Hearing result for Motion held on 07/14/2009 Jon J. Shindurling 
11:00 AM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Nancy Marlow 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: under 50 Mtn for atty fees - Angell to 
ntc 
7/20/2009 BNDC SHULTS Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 32435 Dated Jon J. Shindurling 
7/20/2009 for 100.00)Deposit for clerk's record on 
Appeal. 
MISC MCGARY Clerk's Certificate of Appeal Jon J. Shindurling 
8/6/2009 SHULTS S.C. Acknowledgment of Clerk's Certificate of Jon J. Shindurling 
Appeal. 
SHULTS S.C. notice of Appeal filed due Date 10-6-09 Jon J. Shindurling 
Docket # 36742 
8/31/2009 ORDR GWALTERS Opinion, Decision and Order on Respondent's Jon J. Shindurling 
Mtn for Atty Fees: Respondent's Mtn for Atty Fees 
is DENIED. (see doc for details). 
TRAN MCGARY Transcript Filed (3-9-09 hearing) Jon J. Shindurling 
9/29/2009 MOTN MCGARY (copy) Motion to Use Digital Clerk's Record Jon J. Shindurling 
10/5/2009 SHULTS S.C. the following documents were filed with S. C. Jon J. Shindurling 
(Respondent's Motin to Use Digital Clerk's 
Record (CD Attatched). 
11/17/2009 NOTC SHULTS Notice of Withdrawal of Motion to Use Digital Jon J. Shindurling 
Clerk's Record. 
03 
ASSIGNED TO 
JUDGE JON J. SHINDURLlNG 
Dale W. Storer, Esq. (ISB No. 2166) 
DeAnne Casperson, Esq. (ISB No. 6698) 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-0130 
Telephone: (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518 
Attorneys for Petitioner, Stan Hawkins 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
INRE: 
Application for a Variance to Validate the Case No. cV01J- (('{;)~? 
Right to Replace a Single Family 
Dwelling on Parcels Without the Required 
100' of Road Frontage. 
STAN HAWKINS, PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Fee Category: R.2 
Petitioner, Fee: $72.00 
v. 
BONNEVILLE COUNTY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS, acting as a Board of 
Adjustment, 
Respondent, 
v. 
DALE AND MARLA MEYER, husband 
and wife, 
Applicants. 
Petitioner, Stan Hawkins, respectfully submits this Petition for Judicial Review 
pursuant to the provisions ofIdaho Code §§ 67-5270 and 67-6521 and Rule 84 of the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. In support of such Petition, Petitioner alleges as follows: 
1. Petitioner is an individual, residing in Bonneville County, Idaho. 
2. Respondent, the Bonneville County Board of County Commissioners (the 
"Board"), is a political subdivision of the state of Idaho. 
3. Venue of this Petition is proper under the provisions ofIdaho Code § 67-
5272. 
4. On or about January 16,2007, Applicants filed an "Application for 
Variance to Validate the Right to Replace a Single Family Dwelling on Parcels Without 
the Required 100' of Road Frontage" with the Bonneville County Planning and Zoning 
Commission (the "Commission"). The Application sought a determination from the 
Commission that the Applicants were entitled to continue a non-confonning residential 
use of Applicants' property without the required one hundred (100) feet of frontage under 
the Bonneville County Zoning Ordinance. In partiCUlar, the Applicants sought to confirm 
their right to resume use of an existing farm access road across Petitioner's property for 
the purpose of using two abandoned dwelling houses. 
5. The application was heard by the Commission on March 1, 2007, at the 
conclusion of which the Commission granted the Application. On March 8, 2007, 
Petitioner filed aN otice of Appeal to the Board of County Commissioners of Bonneville 
County (the "Board") pursuant to § 1-5-15 of the Bonneville County Zoning Ordinance. 
2 - PETITION FOR JUDlCIAL REVIEW 
6. On May 23,2007, the Commission issued a "Report of Findings and 
Decision", in it it found that the use was "grand fathered in" and did not need a variance. 
7. On June 19,2007, Petitioner filed an Amended Notice of Appeal pursuant 
to § 1-5-13 of the Bonneville County Zoning Ordinance appealing from such written 
"RepOli of Findings and Decision". 
8. Pettitioners' appeal was heard by the Board on September 6, 2007, and the 
Board thereafter issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions and Decision dated October 5, 
2007, upholding the decision of the Commission. 
9. The proceedings before the Commission and the Board were recorded 
magnetically and a copy ofthe tape recording is in the possession of the Clerk of the 
Bonneville County Board of County Commissioners. 
10. Petitioner will file a statement of the issues for Judicial Review within 
fOUlieen (14) days from the date of the filing of this Petition. 
11. A transcript of the proceedings before the Commission and before the 
Board is requested. Petitioner further requests that the Clerks of the Commission and the 
Board prepare and file a complete record of all pleadings, exhibits and other documents 
filed in conjunction with the above-referenced proceedings. 
12. Petitioner further requests that he be awarded his reasonable attorneys fees 
and costs pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-117, 12-121 and 42 U.S.C. § 1988. 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays for relief as follows: 
1. For judicial review of the Board's and Commission's decisions in this 
3 - PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
n 
matter, pursuant to Idaho Code § 67-6521. 
2. For an order reversing the decision of the Board dated October 5, 2007, and 
remanding the matter to the Board for reconsideration consistent with the Court's 
direction. 
3. For an order awarding Petitioner his reasonable attorneys fees and costs 
pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-117, 12-121 and 42 U.S.c. § 1988. 
4. For such other relief as the Court deems just and proper. 
.s+ 
DATED this I day of November, 2007. 
Dale W. Storer, 
Attorney for the Petitioner 
4 - PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
CERTIFICATION 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licens~d attorney in the State of Idaho, resident of 
and with my office in Idaho Falls, and that: 
1. That service of this Petition has been made upon the Bonneville County 
Planning and Zoning Commission and the Bonneville County Board of Commissioners, 
and or their agents and attorneys, as follows: 
a. 
b. 
c. 
d. 
Blake O. Hall 
Anderson Nelson Hall Smith, P.A. 
P.O. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1630 
Ronald Longmore 
Bonneville County Clerk 
Bonneville County Courthouse 
605 N. Capital Ave. 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Steven Serr 
Building & Zoning Administrator 
Bonneville County Courthouse 
605 N. Capital Ave. 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Kipp L. Manwaring 
P.O. Box 50271 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0271 
( v) Mail 
( ) Hand Delivery 
( ) Facsimile 
( 0Mail 
( ) Hand Delivery 
( ) Facsimile 
( v1Mail 
( ) Hand Delivery 
( ) Facsimile 
(/) Mail 
( ) Hand Delivery 
( ) Facsimile 
2. That the clerk of Bonneville County has been paid the estimated fee for 
preparation of the transcripts requested above. 
3. That the clerk of the agency has been paid the estimated fee for the 
preparation of the agency record. 
Dale W. Storer 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. 
G \WPDATA\D\VS\ 14109 Stan Hawkins (Variance)\Pctitioll for Judicial Review.wpd:smm 
5 - PETITION FOR JUDIClAL REVIEW o 
Dale W. Storer. Esq. (ISB No. 2166) 
DeAnne Casperson, Esq. (ISB No. 6698) 
l-IOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.c. 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-0130 
Telephone: (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518 
Attorneys for Petitioner, Stan Hawkins 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
IN RE: 
Application for a Variance to Validate the 
Right to Replace a Single Family Dwelling 
on Parcels Without the Required 100' of 
Road Frontage. 
STAN HAWKINS, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
BONNEVILLE COUNTY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS, acting as a Board of 
Adjustment, 
Respondent, 
v. 
DALE AND MARLA MEYER, husband 
and wife. 
Applicants. 
Case No. CV-07-6123 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
COMES NOW, the Petitioner, Stan Hawkins, and submits the following Statement 
ofIssues for Judicial Review, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 84(d) of the Idaho Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
The issues for which Petitioner will seek Judicial Review include, without 
limitation, the following: 
a. Did the Board violate the provisions of Title 40, Chapter 2, Idaho 
Code when it made a finding that the "spur" road was a public road, 
without giving notice and conducting a separate hearing as required 
by such chapter? 
b. Did the Board violate Petitioner's due process rights in finding the 
"spur" road to be a public road, without providing notice of its intent 
to consider evidence regarding the existence or non-existence of such 
public road? 
c. Did the Board err in determining that the variance should be 
approved, based upon its finding that the "spur road" was a public 
road? 
d. Did the Board and the Planning and Zoning Commission err in 
applying an "intent to abandon" standard in determining that the 
Applicants had not discontinued use of the two old ranch houses, 
under § 1-203, Bonneville County Code? 
e. Did the Board err in failing to apply or follow the definition of 
2 - STA TEMENT OF ISSUES ON JUDICIAL REVIEW 
10 
"street" under § 1-106(77) of the Bonneville County Code, when it 
determined that the Bone frontage road was a public road, the 
abandonment of which constituted a "special circumstance" justifying 
approval of the variance. 
f. Did the Board err in finding that a taking would occur if it enforced 
the non-conforming use provisions of the Bonneville County Code? 
g. Did the Board have lawful authority to waive the provisions of § 1-
707 of the Bonneville County Code, by granting a "variance" under 
Idaho Local Land Use Planning Act and the Bonneville County 
Zoning Ordinance? 
h. Did the Board err as a matter of law in placing the burden of proof 
upon the Petitioner to prove the subject two roads (the frontage road 
and the spur road) were never "formally abandoned?" See 
Homestead Farms v. Teton County, 141 Idaho 855,119 P.3d 630 (S. 
Ct. 2005) 
1. Did the Board err in adopting the finding of the Commission that two 
new, larger residential structures should be allowed, notwithstanding 
§§ 1-201 and 1-202 of the Bonneville County Code? 
J. Did the Board err in adopting the finding of the Commission that the 
County's adoption of § 1-707 of the Code created a "special 
circumstance" justifying the issuance of a variance and that the facts 
3 ~. STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON JUDICIAL REVIEW 11 
supported the granting of a variance under § 1-511 of the Bonneville 
County Code? 
DATED this {f~ day of November, 2007. 
Dale W. Storer 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.c. 
4- STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON JUDICIAL REVIEW 
1 .-, L 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, resident of 
and with my office in Idaho Falls, that I served a true and correct copy of the following 
described pleading or document on the attorney listed below by hand delivering, mailing 
or by facsimile, as indicated below, with the correct postage thereon, on this {if ~ay of 
November, 2007. 
DOCU.MENT SERVED: STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON JUDICIAL REVIEW 
ATTORNEY SERVED: 
Kipp L Manwaring 
381 Shoup Avenue, Suite 210 
P.O. Box 50271 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-027 I 
Blake G. Hall 
Anderson Nelson Hall Smith, P.A. 
P.O. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1630 
Steven Serr 
Bonneville County Planning and Zoning 
605 N. Capital Ave. 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
G \\vPDATA\DWS\ 14109 " Stan Ha\\·kins (Variance)\Statement of Jssues "'pd.sm 
( AMail 
( ) Hand Delivery 
( ) Facsimile 
( ) Courthouse Box 
( . ___ ) Mail 
( ) Hand Delivery 
( ) Facsimile 
( ) Courthouse Box 
(~) Mail 
( ) Hand Delivery 
( ) Facsimile 
( ) Courthouse Box 
Dale W. Storer 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. 
5 -- ST A TEMENT OF ISSUES ON JUDICIAL REVIEW 1 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE· 
IN RE: ) 
) 
Application for a Variance to Validate ) 
the Right to Replace a Single Family ) 
Dwelling on Parcels Without the Required ) 
100' of Road Frontage. ) 
) 
STAN HAWKINS, ) 
) 
Petitioner, ) 
) 
-vs- ) 
) 
B01\;rNEVILLE COUNTY BOARD OF ) 
COMMISSIONERS, acting as a Board of ) 
Adjustment. ) 
) 
Respondent, ) 
) 
-vs- ) 
) 
DALE AND MARLA MEYER, husband ) 
and wife, ) 
) 
Applicants. ) 
) 
Case No. CV-2007-6123 
SCHEDULING ORDER FOR 
RECORD/TRANSCRIPT AND 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
Whereas, the Petition for Judicial Review of Agency's Final Order was filed November 
14, 2007, and 
Whereas, Rule 84(j)(1), LR.C.P., provides that judicial review of agency actions shall be 
based upon the record created before the agency, and 
Whereas, Rule 840)(2), LR.C.P., provides that a transcript shall be prepared as provided 
in Rule 84(k), LR.C,P" and 
Page - I 
Whereas, Rule 84(k)(1 )(A) provides that the petitioner shall pay the estimated fee for 
preparation of the transcript as determined by the transcriber within fourteen (14) days after filing 
the petition for judicial review, and 
Whereas, Rule 84(k)(1)(B), I.R.C.P., provides that upon payment of the estimated 
transcript fees, the transcriber shall prepare the transcript and lodge it with the agency within 
fourteen (14) days from the date of the payment of the estimated fee, and 
Whereas, Rule 84(0), I.R.C.P., provides that upon receipt of the transcript, the agency 
shall mail notice of lodging to the district court, and 
Whereas, the above named case will be brought before the Honorable Jon J. Shindurling, 
District Judge, on the day -""-'-.:::--'+\-' 2008, at the hour of ~: _~.m. to report on the 
status of this action and to schedule further proceedings. 
Whereas, the time within which a transcript should be prepared has expired; 
Now, therefore, notice is hereby given pursuant to Rule 84(s), I.R.C.P., that failure to 
prepare and lodge a transcript with the proper agency within fourteen (14) days of the date of this 
order shall result in dismissal of the Petition for Judicial Review of Agency's Final Order. 
DATED this ~ay of June, 2008. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this day oDune, 2008, I did send a true and correct corY of the 
foregoing document upon the parties listed below by mailing with the correct postage thereon; by causing 
the same to be placed in the respective courthouse mailbox; or by causing the same to be han<lllelivered. 
Blake G. Hall, Esq. 
ANDERSON, NELSON, HALL & SMITH 
P.O. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1630 
/ [vJ Courthouse Box [ ] U.S. Mail 
Ronald Longmore 
Bonneville County Clerk 
Bonneville County Courthouse 
605 NOl1h Capital Avenue 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
[v(COUl1house Box [ ] U.S. Mail 
Steven Serr 
Building & Zoning Administrator 
Bonneville County Courthouse 
605 North Capital Avenue 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
[ J COUl1house Box [v{u.S. Mail 
Kipp L. Manwaring, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 50271 
Idaho Falls, 1D 83405-0271 
[ ] Hand Delivered [ ] Fax 
[ ] Hand Delivered [ ] Fax 
[ J Hand Delivered [ J Fax 
[ J Courthouse Box [\,(u.S. Mail [ ] Hand Delivered [ ] Fax 
Dale W. Storer, Esq. 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0130 
/ 
[\fCourthouse Box [ ] U.S. Mail ] Hand Delivered [ ] Fax 
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RONALD LONGMORE 
Clerk of the District Court 
Bonneville County, Idaho 
/'\I~ 
By ! "~ 
Deputjy Clerk 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
STAN HAWKINS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BONNEVILLE COUNTY BOARD OF, 
COMMISSIONERS 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-2007-6123 
MINUTE ENTRY ON 
STATUS CONFERENCE 
On July 28, 2008, at 9: 15 A.M., a status conference came on for hearing before the 
Honorable Jon 1. Shindurling, District Judge, sitting in chambers at Idaho Falls, Idaho. 
Ms. Grace Walters, Deputy Court Clerk, was present. 
Mr. Dale Storer was present on behalf of the plaintiff. 
Mr. Blake Hall was present on behalf of the defendant. 
Mr. Kipp Manwaring was present on behalf of the Meyers. 
After a brief discussion, the Court set a briefing schedule for the parties. The opening 
brief is due by September 12, 2008, the response brief due by October 10, 2008, and the reply 
brief due on October 24,2008. 
The conference was thus adjourned. 
c: Dale Storer 
Blake Hall 
Kipp Manwaring 
MINUTE ENTRY - I 1 
Dale W. Storer 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
P. O. Box 50130 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Telephone: (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518 
Idaho State Bar No. 2166 
Attorney for Petitioner 
8aN!~EVILL£ CDU~ . 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
INRE: 
Application for a Variance to Validate the 
Right to Replace a Single Family 
Dwelling on Parcels Without the Required 
1009 of Road Frontage. 
STAN HA WKINS, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
BONNEVILLE COUNTY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS, acting as a Board of 
Adjustment. 
Respondent, 
v. 
DALE AND MARLA MEYER, husband 
and wife, 
Applicants. 
Case No. CV-07-6123 
PETITIONER'S BRIEF 
COMES NOW, the Petitioner, Stan Hawkins, and submits the following 
Memorandum Brief in support of his Petition for Judicial Review, pursuant to Rule 84 of 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure" 
NATURE OF CASE 
Petitioner Stan Hawkins ("Hawkins") seeks judicial review of a decision by the 
Bonneville County Board of Commissioners granting a variance allowing Dale and Marla 
Meyer ("Meyers" or "Applicants") to demolish and replace two (2) dilapidated ranch 
houses with two (2) new, larger residential structures. The variance was necessary 
because the parcels on which the old ranch houses sit do not have the one hundred (l00) 
feet of road frontage which the Bonneville County Building and Zoning Ordinance now 
requires of parcels used for residential purposes. The variance allows the Meyers to 
replace their existing ranch houses "without placement or size limitations!9 The variance 
was also granted notwithstanding that Meyers have not used the ranch houses for nearly 
ten (10) years and despite the fact that the County zoning ordinance states that "any 
nonconforming use which is discontinued for one (1) year or more shall thereafter be in 
conformance with all the provisions of the zoning ordinance." The new structures, if 
allowed, will derive access to the County road across an existing, single lane farm access 
easement which traverses the Petitioner's property.l 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
On or about January 16,2007, Applicants filed an "Application for Variance" (the 
IThis lane was variously referrd to as the "spur road" in the proceedings before the Board of County Commissioners. 
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"Application"). Comm. R. p.l? The purpose ofthe variance, as noted by the Planning and 
Zoning Commission (the "Commission"), was to "validate the right to replace a house on 
parcels without the 100' frontage on an approved road." Comm. R.175. The Application 
sought a determination from the Commission that the Applicants were entitled to resume 
the nonconforming residential use of the two ranch houses without the one hundred (l00) 
feet of frontage on a County road which is required under the Bonneville County Building 
and Zoning Ordinance ("Zoning Ordinance" or "BCBZO,,).3 The Commission heard the 
Application on March 1,2007, and at the conclusion of the hearing the Commission 
verbally granted the Application. Comm. Tr. p.134, L.1O through p.l3S, L.4. 
On March 8, 2007, Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal to the Board of County 
Commissioners of Bonneville County (the "Board") pursuant to BCBZO, § 1-513. 
Comm. R.p.185. Following the filing of the Petitioner's Notice of Appeal, the 
Commission issued a "Report of Findings and Decision," in which it granted the variance 
for the construction of "new residences on these tracts ofland." Comm. R.p.l75-79. On 
June 19,2007, Petitioner filed an Amended Notice of Appeal from the Commission's 
written findings pursuant to BCBZO § 1-513. Board R.p.73. The Board heard 
Petitioners' appeal de novo on September 6,2007, and the Board thereafter issued its 
2Because the official record filed with the Court was not paginated, Petitioner has, for the Court's convenience, 
attached a CD-ROM containing "Bates-stamped" copies of the agency record before the Planning and Zoning Commission and 
the agency record before the Board of County Commissioners. A copy of the record created at the Planning and Zoning hearing 
before Commission is included on the CD-ROM as "Appendix A," and is cited herein as "Comm. R. _" A copy of the record 
created at the hearing before Board of County Commissioners is also contained on the CD-ROM as "Appendix B," and is cited 
herein as "Board R. " 
3 A copy of the Bonneville County Building and Zoning Ordinance is contained in the attached CD-ROM as Appendix 
"C." 
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Findings of Fact, Conclusions and Decision dated October 5, 2007. In that decision, the 
Board adopted the Commission's findings and upheld the earlier decision of the 
Commission to grant the variance. Board R.p.l35. On October 26,2007, Petitioner filed 
the instant Petition for Judicial Review with this Court. 
At the Planning and Zoning level, the Commission found that there was no 
enlargement of the land (as contrasted with the enlargement of the foot print of the two 
ranch houses) devoted to the non-conforming use.4 Comm. R.p.177. Thus, the 
Commission concluded that the Meyers' Application to resume their non-conforming use 
did not violate BCBZO § 1-202, notwithstanding specific language of that section which 
provides that "no permit shall be issued which shall have the effect of increasing the floor 
space devoted to the nonconforming use .. , ," Comm. R.p.177. The Commission also 
held that the very fact that the property was nonconforming, - i.e. because it lacked the 
required frontage on a County road, - was a "special circumstance" justifYing the 
granting of the variance. Comm. R.p.178. Finally, although the Commission expressly 
granted the variance to replace the old ranch houses with newer structures, it also held 
that the variance was unnecessary because the Applicants' parcels, had a "grandfathered" 
right to continue. Comm. R.p.178. 
In its October 5, 2007 Decision, the Board of County Commissioners adopted the 
findings of the Planning and Zoning Commission by reference and approved the 
Commission's decision. Board R. pp.l35 through 137. The Board's decision also held 
4Meyers sought not only pennission to enlarge the size of the existing ranch houses, but also to move them to a 
different location. 
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that it would be a "taking" to deny the Applicants the right to construct two (2) entirely 
new residential structures. Board R. p.136-37. Further, the Board concluded that the 
IY1eyers were entitled to construct new recreational homes under the nonconforming use 
provisions of BCBZO, § 1-203, on the basis that there was "no intent by the :Meyers to 
abandon the residential uses of these parcels." Board R. p.137. Such decision was made 
notwithstanding the provision of § 1-203 of the BCBZO which provides that the right to 
maintain a nonconforming use is lost when the use "is discontinued for a period of one 
(1) year or more." (emphasis added) 
The Board also held that the variance was unnecessary based on "new evidence" 
that a separate "spur road" leading to the old ranch houses and traversing Petitioner's 
land, was a County road.5 Board R.p.13 7. The most significant consequence of this 
finding is that both of the Meyers' parcels would now have the required frontage if the 
spur road was a lawful County Road.6 This finding was made even through the spur road 
was admittedly not shown on the current County road map and notwithstanding the 
County Road Supervisor's admission that the County was "working to have it formally 
adopted by the County." Board Tr. p. 94, LL 20 through p. 95, L. 7. Further, the Meyers 
submitted no evidence of prescriptive use of the spur road for the required five year 
5Several different roads were at issue in the proceedings below: the Bone Road which was an existing county road; a 
"spur road." and a "frontage road.". Only Bone Road is a County road as indicated by the approved County map. Board Tr. p.94. 
L.22 through p.95, L.7. The "spur road," also called the "farm access road," is essentially a dirt lane which heads nearly due west 
from the Bone Road, crosses the Hawkins' property and then continues west to the Meyers' property. Board R.p.94. The 
"frontage road" was a graveled driveway formerly in existence that provided access from Bone Road to the old Bone store, which 
burned down in the mid 1940's. Board Tf. p.43 LL.2 - 11. 
6The Board's findings are internally inconsistent. On the one hand, their finding that the spur road was a county road 
necessarily holds that the parcels have the required frontage on a county road. On the other hand, the Board expressly adopted 
the findings of the Commission. Board R.p.135. The Commission had specifically found that "[t]hese tracts ofland have no 
frontage on a currently maintained county road." Comm. R.p.l77. 
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period. Rather, the Board apparently relied solely upon a 1961 State ofIdaho road map. 
Board Tr. p. 93, LL 16-20. Despite absence of the spur road from the County Road Map 
and despite the lack of any evidence showing prescriptive use, the Board simply assumed 
that the spur road was an approved county road and then placed the burden on Petitioner 
to show "abandonment" of the road. Petitioner was never given any notice that the status 
of the spur road would be an issue at the hearing before the Board. Board R.p.137. In the 
end, the Board concluded that the "request for variance [should] be approved for the 
replacement of the two homes without placement or size limitations." Board R.p.l37. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the Board err in evaluating Applicants' nonconforming use under an 
"intent to abandon" rather than a "discontinuance" standard? 
2. Did the Board have jurisdiction to declare the existence of a County road, 
outside the context of a statutory validation proceeding under Title 40, Chapter 2, Idaho 
Code? 
3. Did the Board violate the provisions of Title 40, Chapter 2, ofthe Idaho 
Code by finding that the frontage road and spur road were public roads, without 
complying with the required statutory notice and hearing provisions? 
4. Did the Board err as a matter of law by placing the burden on Petitioner to 
prove the spur road was "formally abandoned?" 
5. Did the Board violate Petitioner's due process rights by declaring the 
existence of a County road across Petitioner's property without affording Petitioner notice 
6 - PETITIONER'S BRIEF 
of its intent to conduct a validation hearing? 
6. Did the Board err in finding that a "taking" of the Applicants' property 
would occur absent its granting a variance? 
7. Did the Board err in adopting the Commission's finding that the lack of 
frontage on a County road constituted a "special circumstance" justifying the granting of 
the variance? 
8. Did the Board have authority, under the non-conforming use provisions of 
the County Zoning Ordinance to allow Meyers construction of entirely new structures 
"without placement or size limitations?" 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Petitioner, Stan Hawkins, owns a large dry farm, a portion of which fronts upon 
the County road adjacent to the Bone Store in Bonneville County, Idaho. Mr. Hawkins 
purchased the property relevant to this case in 1998. Board Tr. p.37, L.15-17.7 Mr. 
Hawkins' property is located on the west side of Bone Road, immediately south of the 
present Bone Store. Board R.p.94. The Meyer's dry farm is located further to the west of 
the Hawkins' parcel and is separated from the Bone Road by Hawkins' parcel. Board 
R.p.94. Access to the Meyers parcel is derived via a single lane farm access road which 
traverses Hawkins' property for a distance of approximately eighty (80) feet. Comm. Tr. 
p.31,1.14-19. Currently, there are two dilapidated, nonfunctional ranch houses on the 
Applicants' property which are accessed via the farm access lane that runs across 
7The transcript of the February 28,2007, hearing before the Planning and Zoning Commission is cited herein as 
"Comm. Tr." The transcript of the September 6, 2007, hearing before the Board of County Commissioners is cited herein as 
"Board Tr." 
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Petitioner's property. Neither ranch house is now used for residential purposes. One of 
the houses has not seen use since 2001, (Comm. Tr. p.6, L.17 -19), the other has not been 
lived in for "probably 10 years or more," Comm. Tr. p26, L.16-17. This farm access 
road leads to two (2) old ranch houses, one referred to as the "Max Rockwood House" 
and the other referred to as the "Jefson House". See Comm. Tr. p.6, L.6-21 and Comm. 
Tr. p.lS, L.2-5. The Rockwood House was apparently built in 1936. Comm. TL p.6, L.6-
21. The other horne was built by Mangus Jefson between 1910 and 1912. Cornrn. Tr. 
p.IS, L,2-S. In the mid-1990's, the Meyers' daughter and son-in-law moved the Jefson 
House from its old rock foundation and attempted to remodel the house. Cornrn. Tr. p.18, 
L.16-21. Subsequently, the Meyers decided that the effort to remodel the old ranch house 
was not cost effective and therefore abandoned the remodeling effort. Comm. Tr. p20, 
1.17-19. No one has lived in the Jefson House for "probably 10 years or more." Cornm. 
Tr. p.25, 1.16-17. The Rockwood House has been uninhabited since 200L Cornrn. Tr. 
p.6, LI7-19. 
Neither horne is in currently in a habitable condition. Mrs. Meyer described the 
properties as being in "obsolescence (sic) and poor condition." Cornrn. Tr. p.23, L.19. 
They are both "run-down" and "very dilapidated." Board Tr. p.55, L.19 through p.57, 
L.21. Though power is available in the vicinity of the properties, neither structure is 
currently connected to or using electricity. Cornrn. Tr. p.23, L23-24 and p.48, L.3-14. In 
1999, an appraiser from the Bonneville County Assessor's Office, Leann Christensen, 
determined that the Jefson House "was no longer a liveable horne." Cornrn. Tf. p.28, 
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1.20-22. After that point the Meyers no longer paid property taxes on the home. Comm. 
Tro po2S, L.6-7. 
At the hearing before the Planning and Zoning Commission, Mrs. Meyer admitted 
that the Max Rockwood property "never did" have "County Road frontage."s Comm. Tr. 
p. 6,1. 5; p.27, L.21-25. Mrs. Meyer alleged that the Jefson House "did have a little 
frontage" at one time, but conceded that it does not currently have frontage on a county 
road. Comm. Tr. p.6, L.5-7 and Comm Tr. p.16, 1.12. However, at both the Commission 
hearing and the Board hearing, there was conflicting evidence about whether the Jefson 
parcel ever had frontage on a County road. The dispute focused upon whether the 
frontage road that was formerly used as an access road from the Bone Road to the old 
Bone Store, was at one time a County road. Board Tr. pAl, 1.11 through p.46, L.IS; see 
also map at Board R.p.97. Specifically, the dispute raised the question of whether the 
frontage road formerly serving the Bone store had ever been dedicated as a County road 
and whether the County's alleged relocation of the frontage road was a "special 
circumstance" authorizing the issuance of a variance. Specifically, Meyers contended 
that the Jefson parcel had at one time abutted the frontage road and that the frontage road 
was, at one time, a County-approved road. Comm. Tr. p.21, L.15-19. Further, Meyers 
contended that the Jefson property lost its frontage because the County purportedly 
moved the frontage road "approximately SO feet to the east where it is presently located." 
Comm. Tr. p.21, L.22-24. 
8Despite Mrs. Meyers' admission before the Planning and Zoning Commission, counsel for the Meyers asserted at the 
appeal before the Board of County Commissioners - for the first time - that the Rockwood home did have frontage based on the 
unsupported theory that the farm access road, or "spur road," was a county road. Board Tr. p.76. L.3-6. 
9 PETITIONER'S BRIEF 
28 
On the other hand, Mr. Hawkins contended that the frontage road serving the old 
Bone store had never in fact been dedicated or used as a County road. Rather, he argued 
that the former frontage road was merely a graveled driveway used out of necessity to 
provide access from the Bone Road to former location of the original Bone Store and that 
when the old Bone store was destroyed by fire in the 1940s and the building subsequently 
relocated closer to the main Bone Road, the access provided by the frontage road was no 
longer necessary and that the road was then abandoned. Board Tr. pAl, L.Il through 
pA6, LIB. Mr. Hawkins bolstered his argument by introducing evidence of a judicial 
finding made in 1979 that the property upon which the frontage road was located, had, as 
of 1979, "been [privately] possessed, farmed, and fenced ... for a period in excess of 30 
years." Board Tr. pAS, L.lO-lS. In sum, Mr. Hawkins argued that the discontinued use of 
the frontage road did not change the fact that the lefson property, like the Rockwood 
property, never had frontage on an approved County road and as such the Meyers 
contention that the "relocation" of the frontage road was a "special circumstance" which 
justified a variance, was without any merit. Board Tr. p.33, L23 through p.34, L5. 
At the Board hearing, the Meyers argued - for the first time - that the farm access 
road9 across Hawkins' grain field was also a County road and thus provided the Meyers' 
parcels with the necessary one hundred (l00) feet of frontage, such that a variance was 
not in fact necessary. Board Tr. p.81, L.16-17. This argument was based on a 1961 State 
of Idaho Transportation Department road inventory map that apparently showed the spur 
9This single lane dirt road was variously referred to throughout the hearing as the "spur road." 
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road. Board Tr. p.93, L.16-20. Nevertheless, the County Road Supervisor, Mr. Kevin 
Eckersell, acknowledged that this spur road, as shown on the 1961 State of Idaho map, 
was not listed on the current Bonneville County Road Map and that the County was 
allegedly "working on" having it declared to be a County road. Board Tr. p.95, L.4-7. 
No proof was submitted to the Board that the frontage road or the spur road was 
ever the subject of the validation proceedings or that either the Bone Store frontage road 
or the spur road had ever been included on a County Map as required under Title 20, 
Chapter 2, of the Idaho Code. Further, no evidence was submitted of the County's 
prescriptive use of either road for the required five (5) year period. Instead of requiring 
evidence of the necessary validation proceedings and of the existence of both roads on the 
official County Road Map, the Board simply assumed both roads were public roads. As 
the Board's findings show, after assuming public status of both roads, the Board then 
placed the burden on Mr. Hawkins to show that the roads were abandoned. Board 
R.p.137. The Board placed this burden on Mr. Hawkins despite the fact that Mr. 
Hawkins had no notice that the status of the spur road would be an issue at the hearing. 
The notice published by the County expressly stated that purpose of the hearing was 
discussion of "a variance to validate the right to replace the a single family dwelling on 
each ofthe described parcels without the required 100' of road frontage." Board R.p.2 
(emphasis added). At the Board hearing Mr. Hawkins strenuously objected to the 
manifest unfairness of having to prove the abandonment of a road when he had no notice 
that the spur road's status would be at issue. Board Tr. p.95, L.24 through p.IOO, L.4. 
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Although the Board's notice indicated that the hearing would be to discuss a variance, the 
Board considered the status of the spur road at the variance hearing and then concluded, 
despite a lack of notice or evidence, that the frontage road and the spur road were County 
roads. Board R.p.137. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
The Board Erred in Evaluating Applicants? Nonconforming Use Under an 
"Intent to AbandonH Rather Than a "Discontinuance" Standard. 
Under the BCZBO, non-conforming uses are permitted but the ordinance includes 
provisions that provide for gradual elimination of the non-conforming use. 
Nonconforming uses which were in existence at the time the ordinance was adopted "may 
be continued to the same extent and character as that which existed on the effective date 
of this ordinance." BCBZO § 1-201. (Emphasis added). However, the Ordinance 
specifically states that "[i]f a nonconforming use of land or use of a building ... is 
discontinued for one (1) year or more, any further use of said building or land ... shall 
thereafter be in conformity with the provisions of this ordinance." BCZBO § 1-203 
(emphasis added). The drafters of the ordinance could have expressly required that a 
nonconforming use be abandoned, but for sound policy reasons associated with the 
difficulty of proving subjective intent, the drafters of the ordinance obviously chose a 
discontinuance standard. The plain language of the ordinance indicates that simple 
discontinuance, not intent to abandon, is the condition triggering the termination of the 
right to continue a nonconforming use. 
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The Idaho Supreme Court applies the same principles in construing municipal or 
county ordinances as are used in the construction of state statutes. Spencer v. Kootenai 
County, 145 Idaho 445, 180 P.3d 487,495 (2008). The Court explained that process as 
follows: 
The objective in interpreting a statue or ordinance is to derive 
the intent of the legislative body that adopted the act ... [and] 
[s ]uch analysis begins with the literal language of the 
enactment. Where the language is unambiguous, the clearly 
expressed intent of the legislative body must be given effect, 
and there is no occasionfor a court to consider the rules of 
statutory construction 
ld. (emphasis added and citations omitted). The language of the zoning ordinance at issue 
here is unambiguous. It clearly calls for nonconforming uses to be subject to a 
discontinuance standard, not an intent to abandon standard. Thus, the Board erred in 
imposing the more stringent standard, which would require proof of sUbjective intent, 
rather than mere discontinuance for a specified period of time. 
In a Wisconsin case interpreting an ordinance with a discontinuance provision 
similar to Bonneville County's, the court held that "[t]o apply the 'discontinuance' 
provisions, proof of intent to abandon the nonconforming use is not required ... Under 
the terms of the ordinance, if a nonconforming use has been discontinued for more than 
twelve months, proof of intent to abandon the nonconforming use is not required." 
Lessard v. Burnett County Bd. of Adjustment, 256 Wis.2d 821, 837,649 N.W.2d 728, 736 
(\Vis.App. 2002). 
The public interest and ability to enforce provisions encouraging the gradual 
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elimination of non-conforming uses are best served by a "discontinuance," rather than an 
"intent to abandon" standard. Idaho courts have long held that the purpose of non-
conforming use provisions are "the gradual elimination of non-conforming uses within 
the zoned area .... " O'Connor v. City of Moscow, 69 Idaho 37, 42, 202 P.2d 401,404 
(1949). And while due process requires that nonconforming uses cannot be immediately 
terminated simply by passing a zoning ordinance, "eventually the non-conforming use is 
to be eliminated." Cole-Collister Fire Protection Dist. v. City a/Boise, 93 Idaho 558, 561 
n.3 ,468 P.2d 290,293 (1970). Idaho courts have further stated that public policy 
"dictates the firm regulation of nonconforming use with a view to their eventual 
elimination," and that "nonconforming uses have no inherent right to be extended or 
enlarged." Bastian v. City o/Twin Falls, 104 Idaho 307, 309, 658 P.2d 978, 980 (Ct.App. 
1983) (emphasis added) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Other courts 
have held that "[p ]rovisions permitting nonconforming uses to continue should be 
construed strictly, and zoning provisions restricting nonconforming uses should be 
construed liberally." Trailer Haven MHP, LLC v. City a/Aurora, 81 P.3d 1132, 1139 
(Colo.App.2003). 
Use of an "abandonment" standard wholly defeats the objective of gradually 
eliminating non-conforming uses. The Colorado Supreme Court has noted that requiring 
a showing of subjective intent in discontinuance ordinances "encourages property owners 
to commit perjury, impedes the desirable goal of creating uniform zoning plans, and 
defeats the intention of municipalities in their attempts to avoid imposing such a[ n ] 
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[intent] requirement in the first placeo" Hartley v. City of Co lorado Springs, 764 P.2d 
1216, 1225 (Colo. 1988). Thus,"in the absence of express language to the contrary, intent 
to abandon need not be shown when a zoning ordinance specifies a reasonable time for 
discontinuing a nonconforming use."10 Id. 
The BCZBO was adopted in 1959. Comm. Tr. p.52, L.22 through p.53, L.23; 
Board Tr. p.67, L.9-1 O. It did not immediately bar all nonconforming uses. Rather, it 
allowed any nonconforming use to continue intact unless "discontinued for a period of 
one (1) year or more." BCBZO § 1-203. There was no dispute that the old ranch houses 
on Meyers' parcels were at one time non-conforming because "they do not have, 
currently, frontage on an approved county road." Comm. Tr. p.2, L.21-22; BCBZO § 1-
707. At the hearing before the Board it was uncontested that both the old ranch houses 
had not been used for residential purposes for a period of at least seven (7) years, and 
likely more, before the Meyers applied for their building permit Board Tr. p.55, L.19 
through p.60, L.24. At the February 28,2007 hearing before the Planning and Zoning 
Commission, the Meyers did not present any evidence that either parcel had been used for 
residential purposes after 2001. Comm. Tr., p.6, L.8-19 ("Rockwood" parcel) and p.17, 
L.8 through p.18, L.21 ("Jefson" parcel) Importantly, the Meyers did not deny that use of 
the parcels for residential purposes had been discontinued for a period of more than one 
year; they merely stated that "we have never abandoned those properties." Board Tr. p.90, 
L.5-6. 
lOIn Hartley, the court found that a zoning regulation employing a one-year discontinuance period, similar to ordinance 
at issue here. was reasonable. 764 P.2d at 1224. 
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The unambiguous language of the BCBZO § 1-203 only requires proof that the 
nonconforming use has been "discontinued for a period of one (1) year or more." Here, 
the evidence is uncontested that the Meyers had discontinued the nonconforming 
residential use of their properties for at least seven (7) years before filing the subject 
variance applicationo In this case, the Board simply ignored the unambiguous language of 
its own ordinanceo Nothing in the Ordinance suggests that subjective intent is even an 
issue. As noted above, where the language of an ordinance is unambiguous, the clearly 
expressed intent of the legislative body must be given affect, and there is no occasion for 
a court to employ the rules of statutory constructiono The Board's use of an 
"abandonment" standard was simply fabricated out of whole cloth and has no basis 
whatsoever in the Ordinance. The Board's finding that the two ranch houses had not lost 
their non-conforming use status as a result of the cessation of use, is clearly erroneous as 
a matter of law. The Board's decision should be reversed and the Court should find as a 
matter oflaw that Meyers' have no right to resume use of the old ranch houses. 
II. 
The Board Violated the Provisions of Title 40, Chapter 2, of the Idaho Code 
by Finding That the Spur Road Was a Public Road. 
A. The Board Had No Jurisdiction to Determine the Status of the Spur Road as 
a County Road, Outside the Context of the Statutory Process Established in Title 40, 
Chapter 2, Idaho Code. 
As noted above, the Board held for the first time that the Meyers' application for a 
variance was unnecessary based on "new evidence" that the spur road leading to the two 
ranch houses and traversing Hawkins property was in fact a County road. Board R. p. 
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137. Such finding obviated the need for a variance because the two old ranch houses 
would now have frontage on a dedicated County road. This finding was made even 
though it was undisputed that the spur road was not shown on the current County Road 
Map and there was no proof of prior prescriptive use or a judicial determination of its 
status as a County road. Board Tr. p. 94, LL 20 through p. 95, LL 7. For the reasons set 
forth below, Petitioner submits that the Board should have required proof of a proper 
statutory validation proceeding or a judicial declaration of the spur road status as a 
County road and it was improper to consolidate a statutory validation proceeding into a 
variance hearing, in clear violation of the provisions of Title 40, Chapter 2 of the Idaho 
Code. 
The Idaho Legislative has established a very specific comprehensive process for 
establishing the existence of a county road. Importantly, the process requires a public 
hearing before a highway map designating "each highway and public right-of-way in 
[the] jurisdiction" - can be adopted. I.e § 40-202(l)(a). Additionally, if, after the 
highway map is adopted, the county wishes to "validate" additional roads as highways or 
public rights-of-way, the county must hold a public hearing on the matter and "accept 
testimony from persons having an interest in the proposed validation." I.e. § 40-203A(2). 
Prior to any hearing at which a County will validate the existence of a road, the Board 
must provide adequate notice of the validation proceedings by formal publication. I.C. §§ 
40-203, 40-203A. The statute also requires that prior to any validation proceeding, the 
Board must prepare a report on the proposed validation. I.C. § 40-203A(2). 
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The Legislature has established a very clear and comprehensive procedure by 
which a Board of County Commissioners may itself, adjudicate the status of a road as 
private or pUblic. Thus, outside that carefully delineated statutory procedure, the Board 
has no jurisdiction to declare a road or way to be a public road. That power would reside 
exclusively in a court of law where proper due process procedures could be employed and 
where, the submission of evidence is carefully circumscribed by the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure. There are no provisions in the validation statute allowing a county to conduct 
a validation procedure within the context of a variance hearing. Outside the context of a 
properly noticed and conducted validation hearing, the Board was without jurisdiction to 
determine the status of the spur road in the variance proceeding at hand. 
B. Even Assuming That Consolidation of a Validation Proceeding with a 
Variance Proceeding Was Proper, the Board Failed to Comply with the Statutory 
Procedures in Title 40, Chapter 2 in Any Event. 
Even assuming the Board had jurisdiction to consolidate a validation proceeding 
with a variance hearing, the Board did not follow the statute in any event. There was no 
evidence adduced, either at the Commission hearing or the Board hearing, that the 
requirements of TitIe 40, Chapter 2 of the Idaho Code had been followed, that there had 
been a prior express dedication of the spur road on a county plat or a prior judicial 
adjudication of the County's prior prescriptive use of the spur road lane as a county road. 
Further, the County Road Supervisor admitted that the spur road was not listed as a 
County road on the current County road map. Board Tr. p. 94, LL 20 through p. 95, LL 7. 
Unlike the Meyers, Mr. Hawkins did produce evidence of a prior adjudication of the 
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private nature of the parcel on which the farm access lane or spur road was located. 
Specifically, Mr. Hawkins introduced evidence of a judicial finding that, as of 1979, the 
ground over which the frontage and the spur roads were located had been "possessed~ 
farmed, and fenced", by Bryant N. Rockwood, Hawkins' predecessor, "for a period in 
excess of30 years." Board Tr. p.53, L.IO-I5, Comm. R. pp. 41-48. 11 Such time frame 
certainly embraced the period preceding the 1961 State of Idaho map. 
At the September 6,2007, hearing before the Board, the Meyers contended - for 
the first time - that the spur road was a County road. Board Tr. p.76, L.3-6. Based on that 
assertion, the Meyers contended that "[w]e don't even need a variance." Board Tr. p.77, 
L.6-7. The Board, apparently accepting the Meyers' claim at face value, concluded that 
"the spur road which runs to the west of from [sic] Bone Road also existed." Board 
Kp.13 7. Despite this finding, there is no evidence in the record that the County ever 
prepared a report concerning the spur road's status as a County road or conducted the 
necessary validation proceedings. Further, the notice of the hearing before the Board12 
explicitly stated that the hearing would be "in relation to the appeal by Stan Hawkins to 
the Board of Adjustment approval of the application of Dale & Marla Meyer for a 
Variance to validate the right to replace a single family dwelling on each of the described 
parcels without the required 100' of road frontage. " Board R.p.2 (emphasis added). Thus, 
IIThis judicial decision is erroneously included as part of the Commission record. It should have been part of the 
Board record, because it was only used during the Board hearing. 
12The notice initially indicated the hearing would be on August 7, 2007. However, by agreement of the parties the 
hearing was continued until September 6,2007. 
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the plain language of the notice gives no indication that the Board would be considering 
the status of the spur road as a County road and necessarily assumes that the Meyers' 
parcels lacked the necessary road frontage. Clearly Hawkins had no notice that the 
County intended to conduct a validation proceeding as part of the variance hearing. See 
I.e. § 40-203, 40-203(A). 
As a consequence of the Board's hasty conclusion regarding the status of the spur 
road, Petitioner had no opportunity to present evidence and the Board based its 
conclusion on a one-sided presentation. The Board's failure to prepare a report and the 
lack of proper notice clearly violated the provisions ofLC. § 40-203A. In the absence of 
compliance with those statutory procedures, the Board should have limited its 
consideration of whether a prior statutory validation had been conducted, whether there 
was a prior judicial declaration or whether there was evidence of an express dedication, 
either by plat or deed. The Board's decision should be reversed and the matter remanded, 
with instructions to so limit its deliberations. 
III. 
The Board Erred as a Matter of Law by Placing the Burden on Petitioner to 
Prove That the Spur Road and Frontage Road Were "Formally Abandoned." 
As noted above, Meyers presented absolutely no evidence that the County had 
formally validated the spur road as required by Title 40. Nor was there any evidence that 
the spur road had been acquired by prescription through County maintenance and upkeep 
for a period of five (5) years. J3 See LC. § 40-202(3). Nor was there any evidence of a 
13 As noted above, outside the context of a proper statutory validation proceeding, the Board had no jurisdiction to 
"validate" the spur road as a County road. The argument set forth below assumes arguendo that such jurisdiction did exist, but 
argues that the County's reliance upon the 1961 State ofIdaho map was improper in any event. 
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prior judicial determination of the status of the spur road. Instead the Board relied solely 
upon the 1961 State of Idaho Map, in concluding that the spur road was a County road. 14 
For the reasons set forth below, Petitioner submits that such reliance is in direct conflict 
with the holding of Homestead Farms, Inc, v. Board ofComm 'rs of Teton County, 141 
Idaho 855, 119 P.3d 630 (2005). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has indicated that only when the existence of a road is 
"established," does the burden shift to the opponent of a public road to prove 
abandonment. See Floyd v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Bonneville County, 137 Idaho 718, 
728, 52 P.3d 863, 873 (2002). In that case the Court found that because the evidence 
showed that the County had worked on the road for an eight year period, the road was 
established as a County road and the challengers had to meet the tall burden of proving 
abandonment. However, such is not the case here. There was simply no evidence that the 
spur road had ever been "established" under the statute. Thus, Board erred in finding that 
the burden shifted to the Petitioner to show abandonment. 
To establish the existence of a road, the Board must follow formal procedures 
outlined in Title 40, Chapter 2 of the Idaho Code or undertake judicial action. The 
existence of a public road may be established if the road is formally "laid out, recorded, 
and opened" in a manner that provides the county with an interest in the real property of 
the road, or where the road is "used for a period of five (5) years, provided [it] shall have 
been worked and kept up at the expense of the public." I.C. § 40-202. In Floyd, the 
14Jt should be noted that the same problem exists as to the Meyers' failure to prove the frontage road had been 
validated under Title 40 or that the County had used and maintained the frontage road for the required five (5) year prescriptive 
period. 
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Supreme Court affirmed these requirements. "The criteria to determine a public road has 
been stated as follows: 'When a right-of-way has been used by the general public for a 
period of five years and has been maintained at public expense, the right-of-way becomes 
a public highway." 137 Idaho at 725, 52 P3d at 870 (emphasis added) (quoting State ex 
rel. Haman v. Fox, 100 Idaho 140, 146,594 P.2d 1093, 1099 (1979)). The Supreme Court 
will not sustain a validation proceeding where a governing board makes inadequate 
findings concerning the use and maintenance of the road. See Galvin v. Canyon Highway 
Disi. No.4, 134 Idaho 576, 580, 6 P.3d 826, 830 (2000) (remanding the case because 
"[t]he Board made no findings of fact regarding the establishment and use" of the road in 
question). 
In this case, the only evidence concerning the spur road was a 1961 State of Idaho 
highway map - not a County map as required by I.C. § 40-202 - and the conclusory 
statements by counsel for the Meyers and the County Road Supervisor's claim that the 
County was "working on" declaring the spur road as a County road. Board Tr. p.81, 
L.16-17 and Board Tr. p.93, LA through p.95, L.7. When pressed the County Road 
Supervisor conceded that the current County map did not show the spur road as a County 
road. 
MR. STORER: May I ask just one question? 
COMMISSIONER CHRISTENSEN: You bet. 
MR. STORER: Mr. Eckersell, what does the County Map currently show as far as 
this Spur road, County or not? 
MR. ECKERSELL: It's on the map that we are working to have formally adopted 
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by the County. It is not on the most current State inventory map. But it was on the 
'61 map." 
MR. STORER: I didn't ask that question. What does the current map show? 
MR. ECKERSELL: The current [County] map does not show a spur road. 
Board Tr. p.94, L.20 through p.95, L.7 (emphasis and material in brackets added). At that 
point, Commissioner Christensen interjected with an argument in favor of validating the 
road on the theory that it had never been abandoned. 
COMMISSIONER CHRISTENSEN: Let me address that. 
*** 
You might look at the evidence they've presented, but there was simply no 
record of an abandonment of that, and simply removing it from a map, as I 
understand, that does not constitute an abandonment. 
Board Tr. p.95, L.11-21. In effect Mr. Christensen simply assumed the existence of a 
County road rather than requiring proof that the spur roads had been "established" -
either through a statutory validation proceeding, judicial proceeding or a credible proof of 
prescriptive use. Then, by that artificial assumption, Commissioner Christensen shifted 
the burden to the Petitioner to show that the spur road had been abandoned, despite the 
lack of any proof that the spur road had been acquired by formal dedication, by statutory 
validation, judicial declaration or by prescriptive use for the required five (5) year period. 
An argument similar to that employed by the Board here has been previously 
rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court. "Certainly, if a road is not properly created as a 
public highway, its inclusion on an official county highway system map does not make it 
so .... " Homestead Farms, Inc. v. Board o/Comm 'rs o/Teton County, 141 Idaho 855, 
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860, 119 P.3d 630,635 (2005). The Court then went on io hold that Teton County was 
required to conduct the necessary validation hearing before adding roads to the County 
Road Map. Here, there is no evidence that the spur road was ever "properly created" as a 
County road. Rather, the County relied solely upon the 1961 State of Idaho map as a basis 
for its conclusion that the spur road was a County road. To paraphrase the Homestead 
Farms case, "inclusion on an official [State] highway system map does not make it SO."15 
The Board here made the same mistake as was made by the Board of Commissioners of 
Teton County - that is they assumed the mere inclusion of the spur road on the State of 
Idaho map was sufficient proof of the existence of the County road - and then shifted the 
burden to Petitioner to prove otherwise. As noted in Homestead Farms, such burden 
shifting is improper. 
Because the road was never properly established in the first place, it was improper 
for the Board to shift the burden to Petitioner to show "abandonment." This Court should 
reverse and remand, with instructions to the Board to confine its deliberations to 
ascertaining the existence of an express dedication or determining whether a prior 
statutory or judicial validation has been conducted. 
IV. 
The Board Violated Petitioner's Due Process Rights by Finding the Existence 
of a County Road. 
In Idaho, principles of "due process [are] applicable to proceedings on a request to 
change the land use authorized for a particular parcel of property, regardless of whether 
ISIt is also worthy of note that the 1961 map was a State map, not a County Map. 
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the subject of such proceedings carries the label 'variance' or 'rezoning. '" Gay v. County 
Comm'rs o/Bonneville County, 103 Idaho 626,629,651 P.2d 560,563 (Ct.App. 1982). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that "[ d]ue process concerns have led us to say that 
'[ a]n administrative tribunal may not raise issues without first serving the affected party 
with fair notice and providing him with a full opportunity to meet the issue. '" Hernandez 
v. Phillips, 141 Idaho 779, 781, 118 P.3d 111, 113 (2005) (quoting White v. Idaho Forest 
Industries, 98 Idaho 784, 786, 572 P.2d 887, 889 (1977)). Other courts have noted that 
"[ 0 ]ne of the basic elements of due process is the right of each party to be appraised of all 
the evidence upon which an issue is to be decided, with the right to examine, explain, or 
rebut such evidence." In re Guardianship of MEO, 2006 WY 87, ~ 38, 138 P.3d 1145. 
The February 28,2007, hearing before the Planning and Zoning Commission was 
based on the premise that a variance was necessary because the Meyers' owned "parcels 
without the required 100 foot of road frontage." Comm. Tr. p.2, LA-8. The Planning and 
Zoning Commission's findings specifically stated that "[t]hese tracts ofland have no 
frontage on a currently maintained road." Comm. R.p.178. While there was some 
discussion at the February hearing about the location ofthe Bone Road, and whether the 
frontage road serving the old Bone Store was a County road, (Comm. Tr. p.2l, L.15 
through p.22, L.l), there was no contention at the Planning and Zoning Commission 
hearing that the spur road ever was, or now is, a county road. Thus, at the September 6, 
2007, hearing before the Board, Petitioner had no notice or fair warning that the spur 
road's status as a county road would be an issue. Because Petitioner had no notice that the 
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spur road's status would be an issue, Petitioner had no opportunity to marshal or present 
evidence concerning the spur road. Board Tr. p.96, L.23 through p.97, LA. Nevertheless, 
the Board allowed the introduction of evidence concerning the status of the spur road, 
Board 'fr. p.81, L.16-17, and then totally ignored the County Road Map and its statutory 
obligation to conduct a validation hearing before adding a new road to the County Road 
Map. Board R. p.l37. Simply stated, the Board declared the existence ofa County road 
across Hawkin' s property without ever affording him fair notice and a hearing. 
The spur road was not on the present County road map, and that fact should have 
been the end of it. Alternatively, the Board should have followed the procedure under 
Title 40, Chapter 2, Idaho Code, to determine whether there was a basis for adding the 
spur road to the County Road Map and should have given Petitioner fair notice of its 
intent to consider that issue. Until such proceeding is conducted, it was improper to rely 
upon the spur road as a basis for concluding that the two ranch houses in fact had frontage 
on a County road. Thus, the Board's decision violated Petitioner's due process rights and 
the matter should be reversed and remanded with instructions to the Board to limit its 
consideration solely to ascertaining whether there as been an express dedication or a prior 
statutory or judicial validation. 
v. 
The Board Erred in Finding That a Taking of the Applicants' Property 
Would Occur Absent a Variance. 
A. Amortizing a Non-conforming Use over a Reasonable Period of Time Does 
Not Constitute a Taking. 
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Merely requiring that a particular nonconforming parcel comply with the 
requirements of a zoning ordinance after the nonconforming use has been discontinued 
does not constitute a taking. See, e.g., City of Belton v. Smoky Hill Ry. & Historical 
Society, Inc., 170 S.W.3d 429 (Mo.Ct.App. 2005) (finding that compliance with the 
discontinuance provision of a local ordinance was not a taking and holding that 
"[b ]ecause the use of the tracks was discontinued for more than twelve months, Smoky 
Hill must comply with all applicable zoning ordinances"); Hinsdale v. Village of Essex 
Junction, 153 Vt. 618, 572 A.2d 952 (1990) (upholding a provision in a zoning ordinance 
that prohibits restoration of a nonconforming use if it has been discontinued for a period 
of six months or more); Hartley v. City of Colorado Springs, 764 P.2d 1216 (Colo. 1988) 
(upholding a provision in a zoning ordinance that requires nonconforming uses that have 
been discontinued of a period of one year or more to thereafter comply with all provisions 
of the code). 
Under Idaho law, that a regulatory taking occurs only if an ordinance immediately 
"prohibit[s] the continuation of all existing lawful [uses] within a zoned area." 
O'Connor, 69 Idaho at 41, 202 P .2d at 404. Further, a regulatory takings claimant must 
demonstrate that the property owner has been deprived of all viable economic use of his 
property. See e.g. Covington v. Jefferson County, 137 Idaho 777, 781, 53 P.3d 828,832 
(2002). As long as the property owner may make some reasonable use of its property 
following the passage of an ordinance, then there is no taking even though the value of 
the property may be significantly diminished. Id. Further, in regulatory takings claims, 
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courts employ a "parcel as a whole" rule which requires examination of the entire parcel 
rather than small segments, in determining whether or not viable economic use still exists. 
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 216 F. 3d 
764 (9 th Cif. 2000); Aff'd 535 U.S. 302, 122 S. Ct, 1465, 152 L. Ed. 2d 517 (2002). 
In this case, Meyers presented no evidence whatsoever of any inability to use their 
property if the County's non-conforming use provisions were enforced. To the contrary, 
they freely admitted they had been using their property for many years as a dry farm and 
they presented no evidence that the County's enforcement of its non-conforming use 
provisions would have deprived them of all viable economic use of their dry farm. 
If a County were to immediately terminate a lawful use, without allowing the 
continuance of the non-conforming use, such would be a taking "because not to allow 
them to continue would be a violation of the due process clause." Heckv. Commissioners 
a/Canyon County, 123 Idaho 826, 829 853 P.2d 571,574 (1993) (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). However, "due process does not prevent the county from 
exercising its police power even though the exercise may affect the pre-existing use of the 
property." Id. "Both conforming and nonconforming uses are subject to ordinances and 
regulation of a police nature predicated upon protection of the public health, safety, 
welfare, and general good." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The 
"power to zone derives from the police power," (Sprenger, Grubb Associates. Inc. v. City 
o/Hailey, 127 Idaho 576, 583, 903 P.2d 741, 748 (1995», and though not unlimited, 
"[t]he police power is one of the least limitable of governmental powers, and in its 
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operation often cuts down property rights." Heck, 123 Idaho at 830, 853 P.2d at 575 
(quoting Queenside Hills Realty Co. v. Saxi, 328 U.S. 80, 83 (1346)). 
B. In Idaho, a Taking Does Not Occur Where Property Is Impacted by a 
Zoning Ordinance, Provided the Property Retains Residual Value. 
In the zoning context, the Idaho takings analysis focuses largely on economic 
principles. Idaho courts have held that a "zoning ordinance that downgrades the economic 
value of private property does not necessarily constitute a taking by the government, 
especially if some residual value remains" after the ordinance is applied to the property. 
Covington v. Jefferson County, 137 Idaho 777, 781, 53 P.3d 828,832 (2002) (citations 
and internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, "nonconforming property enjoys no 
special immunity from reasonable [zoning] regulations .... " Bastian v. City a/Twin 
Falls, 104 Idaho 307,309,658 P.2d 978,980 (Ct.App. 1983). 
The rationale behind these holdings is that a "property owner has no vested interest 
in the highest and best use of his land, in the solely monetary sense ofthat term." 
Sprenger, Grubb & Associates, Inc. v. City o/Hailey, 127 Idaho 576,581,903 P.2d 741, 
746 (1995) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). If a property owner is subject 
to "zoning regulations which merely restrict the enjoyment and use of property through 
lawful exercise of the police power. , . he is not entitled to compensation." Id. at 747, 903 
P.2d at 582. In City of Hailey, the city's decision to change the applicable zoning 
classification reduced the value of plaintiffs business property by $800,000. 127 Idaho at 
581,903 P.2d at 746. The Supreme Court went so far as to acknowledge that "[i]t can be 
plausibly argued that the rezoning deprives [the plaintiff] of the highest and best use of its 
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land." Id. Nevertheless, the court found the consequences of the rezone were "not so 
much as to constitute a taking" because the plaintiff still had "adequate options for 
commercial enterprises." Id. Another court, construing similar variance requirements, 
explained that "[h ]ardship is not demonstrated by economic loss alone ... Every person 
requesting a variance can indicate some economic loss. To allow a variance any time 
economic loss is alleged would make a mockery of the zoning program." Xanthos v. Bd. 
of Adjustment a/Salt Lake City, 685 P.2d 1032, 1037 (Utah 1984). 
In this case, without referring to any specific factual basis for its conclusions, the 
Board found that "[i]t would be a taking of land rights to say after an ordinance changed 
that they would no longer be able to maintain their residences without first obtaining road 
frontage to continue an allowed use on the land." Board R.p.136. As an initial matter, that 
statement does not accurately reflect the facts of this case. The BCBZO has existed since 
1959. The County's adoption of the frontage requirement at issue here did not require the 
Meyers (or their predecessors) immediately to obtain frontage in order to continue the 
residential use of the properties. In fact, the ordinance expressly allows nonconforming 
uses to continue. However, consistent with the zoning policy principles outlined above, § 
1-203 provides that if the residential use is discontinued, any subsequent use of the 
property must comply with all the provisions of the ordinance, including the frontage 
requirement. In this case, the residential use has been voluntarily discontinued since at 
least 2001. According to § 1-203 any further use must be in conformance with the 
ordinance. As noted above, the enforcement of discontinuance provisions does not give 
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rise to a taking. 
In sum, the Meyers applied for the variance because their parcels lacked the 
necessary County road frontage under § 1-707. Comm. Tr. p.6, L.2-7. They presented no 
proof that enforcement of the discontinuance provision, would have deprived them of all 
viable economic use oftheir property. As the Board noted, the Meyers' property is in an 
agricultural zone. Board R.p.135. The agricultural zone, among other uses, allows "[t]he 
growing, handling, and storing of agricultural and livestock products, the location of 
buildings, structures, equipment, and facilities incident thereto .... " BCBZO § 1-702(1). 
Meyers presented no proof of an inability to use their property for agricultural purposes. 
The frontage provision which creates the nonconforming use in this case, only 
applies to residential uses. BCBZO § 1-708. Thus, like the property at issue in City of 
Hailey, the Meyers have "adequate options" for economically beneficial use of their 
property as a dry farm. Because the Meyers property retains residual value, no taking 
would occur if the Board fully enforced the non-conforming use provisions of the County 
Zoning Ordinance. 
VI. 
The Board Erred in Finding That the Non-conforming Use Status of Meyer's 
Property Was a Special Circumstance That Justified the Granting of a Variance. 
A. The Adoption of the Zoning Ordinance is Not a Special Circumstance 
Because the Zoning Ordinance Is Applicable to All Property in Bonneville County, Not 
Just the Meyers' Parcels. 
Although the Board has authority to grant variances to the strict application of the 
zoning ordinance under BCBZO § 1-511, that authority is limited to situations where 
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"special circumstances peculiar to the particular lot or parcel" prevent use of the property 
in a manner reasonably similar to other lots in the same zone. The special circumstances 
must not "apply generally to the other properties in the same zoneo" BCBZO § 1-511. 
Before granting a variance, the Board must find that special circumstance are such that a 
strict application of the ordinance would deprive "appellant's property. 0 • of privileges 
possessed by the properties in the same zone." BCBZO § 1-511. 
In this case, both the Planning and Zoning Commission and the Board found that 
"special" circumstances attach to the Meyers' parcels because "they were developed prior 
to the effective date of the Zoning Ordinance." Comm. R.p.183 and Board R.p.136. The 
mere fact that the two old, log ranch houses were constructed prior to the adoption of the 
street frontage provision of the BCBZO does not create a special circumstance because 
Meyers' property is no different than any other non-conforming use in the Count Yo Stated 
otherwise there is nothing "special" or "unique" about non-conforming uses - they 
frequently result when a governing entity changes a zoning regulation or law. If the 
Board's logic were adopted, every non-conforming use would constitute a "special 
circumstance" Justifying a variance and the restrictions in the non-conforming use 
ordinance designed to eventually bring the use into conformance, would be totally 
thwarted. The Board's logic is entirely circuitous. In effect, the Board's logic is this: If 
a non-conforming use can be shown, such non-conformity is a "special circumstance" and 
therefore is grounds for granting a variance. Accordingly, because of the non-conforming 
use status is a "special circumstance" the property owner need not comply with the non-
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conforming use provisions. Such logic is absurd and would allow property owners in 
every case to entirely circumvent the restrictions in the ordinance designed to gradually 
eliminate the non-conformity. 
Similarly, to premise the finding of a "special circumstance" upon the fact that the 
governmental entity caused the non-conformity is equally illogical. A non-conforming 
use is always caused by the governmental agency. Non-conforming cases are a direct 
result of the governmental entity's passage of a ordinance that makes the existing use 
"non-conforming." Once again, if the fact that the governmental entity is the cause of the 
non-conformity is grounds for granting a variance under the "special circumstance" 
provisions, such would entirely circumvent the non-conforming use provisions - all non-
conforming uses would constitute "special circumstances." In this case, the County's use 
of that boot strap was nothing more than a device to circumvent the application of their 
own ordinance. 
In summary, the Board's action undermined the objective of "gradual elimination 
of non-conforming uses ... " O'Conner v. City a/Moscow, 69 Idaho at 42,202 P.2d at 
404; see also Basitan v. City a/Twin Falls, 104 Idaho 307,309,658 P.2d 978, 980 
(CLApp. 1983). By premising the variance on the fact that the adoption of the street 
frontage provision was a "special circumstance" that justified the granting of a variance, 
the Board essentially gutted its non-conforming use ordinance. The non-conforming use 
ordinance clearly regulates the scope of the nonconforming use and plainly provides for 
eventual elimination ofthe nonconforming use. See BCBZO §§ 1-201 and 1-203. If the 
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Board's logic is adopted, all non-conforming use would be a "special circumstance" 
justifying a variance, and the non-conforming uses restrictions could be circumvented in 
every instance. 
B. The Meyers Did Not Qualify for a Variance Because The Hardship Was Self 
Created. 
As noted above, the use of the two ranch houses was discontinued while Meyers 
owned the property. Hence, their need for a variance was self-created and they do not 
therefore qualify for a variance under the express terms of the BCBZO. 
VII. 
The Board Had No Authority under the Non-conforming Use Provisions of 
the BCBZO to Allow Entirely New Structures "Without Placement or Size 
Limitations." 
As noted above, the Commission found that there was no enlargement of the land 
required for the construction of the two new residential structures, and accordingly 
Meyer's proposal did not violate BCBZO § 1-202. Comm. R. p. 177. As noted above, 
the board adopted the findings of the Commission. Board R. pp. 135 through 137. The 
Commission thus concluded that Meyers' application was consistent with BCBZO § 1-
202, notwithstanding the express language stating that "[N]o permits shall be issued 
which shall have the effect of increasing the floor space devoted to the non-conforming 
use ... " The Board adopted the same conclusion and then, without citing to any 
provision in the BCBZO, it added that "normal interpretation of the ordinance is to allow 
the use to continue and even develop and expand, so long as they do not make the non-
compliance worse." Board R. p. 136. (Italics added). The Board further concluded that 
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Meyers' application should "be approved for the replacement of the two homes without 
placement or size limitations." Board R. p. 137. 
In reaching these conclusions, the Commission and the Board simply ignored the 
unambiguous language of their own ordinance and the well recognized case law cited 
above regarding liberal construction of ordinance provisions limiting expansion or 
continuation of non-conforming uses. Meyers' application clearly sought authority to 
construct two entirely new dwellings with larger foot prints at different locations on the 
property. Comm. Tr. p. 29, LL 21 - 24; p. 100, LL 1 - 3. The BCBZO expressly states 
that "[N]o non-conforming use of building, structure or land shall be extended or 
enlarged." BCBZO § 1-201. (Italics added). The BCBZO also provided that "[N]o 
permit shall be issued which shall have the effect of increasing the floor space devoted to 
the non-conforming use." The Board's and Commission's conclusion that the above 
language referred to only the size of the land is directly inconsistent with the specific 
reference in § 1-202 to "increasing the floor space." Further, the Board's conclusion that 
the application should be granted "without placement or size limitations" is directly 
contrary to the express provisions of the Ordinance stating that "no non-conforming use 
of building, structures or land shall be extended or enlarged." Simply stated, both the 
Board and the Commission simply ignored the plain language of their own ordinance. 
Idaho Courts have held on numerous occasions that "a non-conforming use is not allowed 
to expand." See Taylor v. Board of County Commissioners, 124 Idaho 392,397,860 P.2d 
8, 13 (Ct. Appt. 1993). Local zoning authorities have no authority to ignore the plain, 
35 - PETITIONER'S BRIEF 
unambiguous language of their own ordinance. Fisher v. City o/Ketchum, 141 Idaho 
349,346, 109 P.3d 1091, 1098 (S. Ct. 2004); Magic Valley Sand and Gravel, 140 Idaho 
115, 120, 190 P.3d 340,345 (S. Ct. 2004). Where an agency acts without authority, "it is 
acting without a reasonable basis in fact or law." Ibid. 
In sum, both the Commission and the Board ignored the plain language of the 
BCBZO. The Board had no authority whatsoever to allow the proposed enlargement, 
relocation and construction oftwo entirely new structures "without placement or size 
limitations." The purpose of the non-conforming use provisions in the BCBZO was to 
provide for the "gradual elimination ofthe non-conforming use." 0 'Conner v. City off 
}vfoscow, supra. Contrary to that self-evident intent, the Board's allowance of the 
Meyers' application accomplished just the opposite, to wit: Enlargement and 
continuation ofthe non-conforming use. The Board acted arbitrarily, capriciously and 
without a reasonable basis in law or fact. The Board's determination should be reversed, 
and the matter should be remanded with instructions to comply with the provisions of §§ 
1-201 and 202 of the BCBZO. 
CONCLUSION 
The Board and Commission committed numerous errors as a matter of law. The 
Board clearly applied the wrong standard in determining whether or not the use of the two 
old ranch houses had been discontinued for a period of more than one year. The Board 
also erred in relying upon the 1961 State of Idaho map and in finding the "spur road" to 
be a County road, without conducting the required validation under Title 40, Chapter 2 of 
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the Idaho Code. The Board also violated Hawkins' due process rights in failing to 
provide him with fair notice and a hearing prior to declaring the existence of a County 
road across his property. The Board also erred in concluding that non-conforming use 
status, precipitated by the County's adoption of the frontage requirement, was a "special 
circumstance" justifying the granting of the variance. Finally, the Board erred in 
concluding that it would be a "taking" of the Meyers' property if the Board enforced the 
terms and conditions of its non-conforming use ordinance. 
Accordingly, the Board's decision should be reversed, and the lapse of the non-
conforming use declared as a matter of law. Alternatively, the matter should be remanded 
with directions to the Board to follow the plain language of the BCBZO. 
11 
DATED this tJ. day of September, 2008. 
Dale W. Storer 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. 
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Application for a Variance to Validate the 
Right to Replace a Single Family Dwelling 
on Parcels Without the Required 100, 
STAN HAWKINS 
Petitioner, 
v. 
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v. 
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RESPONDENT BONNEVILLE 
COUNTY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONER'S RESPONSE 
BRIEF 
COMES NOW, the Respondent, Bonneville County Board of Commissioners, and 
pursuant the Court's Minute Entry on Status Conference entered July 29,2008 and Rule 84 
RESPONDENT BONNEVILLE COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONER'S BRIEF - I 
of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure submits its Response Brief. 
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an action filed by Stan Hawkins ("Hawkins") under the Idaho Administrative 
Procedure Act (Idaho Code § 67-5201 et seq.) seeking judicial review of the Bonneville 
County Board of Commissioner's ("the Board") decision to approve the variance applied for 
by Green Valley Ranch, Inc. (an Idaho Corporation owned by Dale and Marla Meyer) 
("Meyers") to replace two residences on two large adjoining tracts of land owned by the 
Meyers identiiied by the Bonneville County Assessor's office as parcel numbers 
RPOIS40E292513 and RPOI S40E206478. Board R. p. 93. 1 
B. Course of Proceedings 
On or about J anumy 16, 2007, the Meyers filed an "Application for Variance", 
which sought to establish the right to replace residences on two tracts of land owned by 
them. Comm. R. p. 1. The Meyers wanted to validate that they had the ability to build 
replacement dwellings on their two parcels of propeliy in light of the fact that they believed 
that currently neither parcel of property had the required frontage along a county approved 
road as set forth in Bonneville County Zoning & Building Ordinance § 1-707. Comm. Tr. p. 
2, 11. 13-22. The Bonneville County Board of Adjustments ("the Commission") heard the 
application on the night and early morning of Februmy 28, 2007 - March 1, 2007 and at the 
conclusion of the hearing made a verbal determination granting the Meyers' "Application 
IRespondent Bonneville County will refer to the record created before the Board of County 
Commissioners as "Board R. __ " and the record created before the Planning and Zoning Commission as 
"Comm. R. __ " and refer to the bates-stamped numbers of said records just as in Petitioner's brief to maintain 
consistency and conformity for the Court. 
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for Variance". Comm. Tr. pp. 134-135.2 
On March 8, 2007 Hawkins filed a Notice of Appeal to the Bonneville County Board 
of Commissioners ("the Board"). Comm. R. pp. 185-187. Thereafter, the Commission 
issued its "Report of Findings and Decision" dated May 23, 2007, which set forth in writing 
the Commission's decision to grant the Meyers' Application for Variance. Comm R. pp. 
175-179. Hawkins then filed an Amended Notice of Appeal dated June 19,2007. Board R. 
pp. 73-75. The Board heard Hawkins' appeal de novo on September 6, 2007 and issued its 
Findings of Fact, Conclusion and Decision dated October 5, 2007 in which the Board upheld 
the Commission's decision to grant the Meyers' Application for Variance. Board R. pp. 
135-137. Hawkins then filed a Petition for Judicial Review with this COUli dated October 
26,2007. Board R. pp. 128-132. 
C. Statement of Facts 
The Meyers own two adjoining tracts of land identified by the Bonneville County 
Assessor's Office as parcel numbers RPO 1 S40E292513 and RPO 1 S40E2064 78, referenced 
respectively as the Jefson Homestead and the Rockwood Parcel. Board R. p. 93. The 
properties at issue are designated as an Agriculture area on the zoning map of Bonneville 
COllnty, which allows a dwelling with a minimum lot size of one acre. Comm. R. p. 175; 
Bonneville County Building and Zoning Ordinance ("BCBZO") § 7-102. The properties 
have been used for agricultural and residential uses since approximately 1910 and 1936 
respectfully. Comm. R. p. 175; Board R. p. 136. The dwellings on the propeliies were built 
2For consistency and conformity the transcript of the February 28, 2007, hearing before the Bonneville 
County Board of Adjustments is cited herein as "Comm. Tr.'· and the transcript of the September 6, 2007 hearing 
before the Bonneville County Board of Commissioners is cited herein as "Board Tr.". 
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prior to the effective date of the BCBZO. Comm R. p. 175; Board R. p. 136. 
The Jetson Homestead is situated south and west of the present Bone Store in 
Bonneville County, Idaho. Located approximately 114 mile west of the Bone Store is the 
eastern boundary of the Rockwood Parcel. Jd. The Meyers have owned the Jefson 
Homestead since 1972 and their predecessors in interest relate back to Mangus Jefson, who 
was granted a patent deed to the property in 1915. Board R. 48. Before obtaining the deed, 
.T efson had constructed a dwelling in parcel sometime between 1910 - 1912. Comm. Tr. p. 
15, 11. 3-4. Since then the dwelling has been kept and maintained. Comm. Tr. p. 17-18 . 
.Tefson sold to Orin Hayden and Hatden built a small store situated on the n0l1heast corner of 
the Jefson Homestead fronting what was then the public Bone Road. Hayden then sold to 
Spencer Williams. 
In 1928, Williams began operating the original Bone Store and established the Bone 
Post Office. Comm. Tr. p. 17, 11. 13-15. Early photographs show the Bone Road running 
the along the east front orthe Bone Store and nearby Bone School and such photographs 
show the spur road running east from the Bone Road just north of the store. Board R. pp. 43, 
51. From approximately 1972 to 1999 the Meyers rented the dwelling on the lefson 
Homestead to tenants and otherwise improved the dwelling. Comm. Tr. p. 18, 11. 7-21. 
However, owing to the eruption of a spring on the front side of the dwelling, said dwelling 
was no longer habitable and the Meyers moved the dwelling and placed it on moving 
timbers and bank of dirt where it cun-ently rests. Comm. R. p. 22, 11. 9-14. 
Don Ranberg and Ruby Ranberg were the early owners of the Rockwood Parcel and 
they constructed a dwelling on their land in 1936. COl11m. R. p. 6, 11.10-12. Subsequently, 
RESPONDENT BONNEVILLE COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONER'S BRIEF - 4 
59 
Max and Maxine Rockwood bought the propeliy and lived in the dwelling until 1992. 
Comm. R. p. 6, 11. 12-14. In 2001 the Meyers purchased the Rockwood Parcel from the 
Rockwood's daughter and have made improvements to the dwelling and surrounding 
property since that time. Comm. R. p. 6, 11. 17-25; p. 7, 11. 1-3. However, due to the 
dwelling's proximity to Canyon Creek, the dwelling is in a flood plain and must be removed. 
Comm. R. p. 8, 11. 4-9. Access to the dwelling on the Rockwood Parcel has always been by 
way of the spur road. Comm. R. p. 178. 
Several sworn affidavits were presented attesting to the fact that the original Bone 
Store was located south and west of the existing Bone Store and that when the original Bone 
Store was operating, a public access road ran along the front of the store and that the spur 
road was a public access road servicing the school and houses west of the original Bone 
Store. Board R. pp. 29-41. Sometime in the late 1950's Bonneville County changed the 
course of the Bone Road near the original Bone Store resulting in movement of the road 
eastward. Comm. R. p. 19, 11. 10-12. Consequently, the Jefson Homestead lost its road 
frontage property and a gap of land was created between the new Bone Road and the old 
road, store, school, and spur road. Comm. R. p. 19,11. 10-21. 
The gap is the narrow strip of land owned by Hawkins and identified by the 
Bonneville County Assessor's Office as parcel number RP01S40E292415. Board R. p. 50, 
93. The Hawkins property abuts Bone Road on its eastern boundary and abuts the Jefson 
Homestead on its western boundary. ld. 
Crossing the northern portion of the Hawkins property and a few hundred feet to the 
immediate south of the current site of the Bone Store is the aforementioned spur road, which 
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begins at the Bone Road and runs west for approximately 114 mile terminating in the lefson 
Homestead. Board R. p. 50. According to Idaho Transportation Department road 
maintenance maps for 1961, the spur road was designated as part of Bonneville County's 
public road system and according to Bonneville County records the spur road was never 
vacated/abandoned. Board R. p. 50; Board Tr. p. 93,11. 1-20. Since the movement of the 
Bone Road, the spur road continued to be used by the public and landowners to access the 
dwellings on the lefson Homestead and Rockwood Parcel and the Meyers have used the 
spur road for ingress and egress to the dwellings and farm ground since acquiring ownership 
to the properties. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held: 
The Local Land Use Planning Act (LLUPA) allows an affected person to seek 
judicial review of an approval or denial of a land use application, as provided 
for in the Idaho Admininstrative Procedural Act (IDAPA). Idaho Code § 67-
6521 (1)( d). For purposes of judicial review ofLLUPA decisions, a local 
agency making a land use decision, such as the Board of Commissioners, is 
treated as a govenunent agency under IDAP A. 
Cowan v. Board o[Commissioners of Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501, 508, 148 P.3d 1247, 
1254 (2006) (citations omitted). 
The Court defers to the agency's findings of fact unless they are clearly 
erroneous; and the agency's factual determinations are binding on the 
reviewing court, even when there is conflicting evidence before the agency, so 
long as the determinations are supported by evidence in the record. 
Spencer v. Kootenai County, 145 Idaho 448, _,180 P.3d 487, 491 (2008) (citations 
omitted). 
The Court shall affirm the zoning agency's action unless the Court finds that 
the agency's findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are: '(a) in 
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violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (b) in excess of the statutory 
authority of the agency; (c) made upon unlawful procedure; (d) not supported 
by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; and (e) arbitrary, capricious, 
or an abuse of discretion.' The party attacking a zoning board's decision must 
first illustrate that the board erred in a manner specified therein and must then 
show that a substantial right of the party has been prejudiced. Finally, 
planning and zoning decisions are entitled to a strong presumption of validity; 
this includes the board's application and interpretation of their own zoning 
ordinances. 
Cowan v. Board olCommissioners a/Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501, 508,148 P.3d 1247, 
1254 (2006) (citations omitted). 
"Substantial and competent evidence is less than a preponderance of evidence, but 
more than a mere scintilla." Cowan v. Board a/Commissioners 0/ Fremont County, 143 Idaho 
501,517,148 P.3d 1247,12563 (2006) (citations omitted). 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. Hawkins' Petition for Judicial Review fails as a matter of law because 
Hawkins cannot show that a substantial right of his has been prejudiced in 
this matter. 
Idaho Code § 67-5279(4) states: "Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (2) 
and (3) of this section, agency action shall be af1irmed unless substantial rights of the 
appellant have been prejudiced." The Idaho Supreme Court has found that such "substantial 
rights" include a person's ability to access their propeli)' and develop their propel1y for 
permissible uses. Lane Ranch Partnership v. City a/Sun Valley, 145 Idaho 87, _, 175 P.3d 
776, 780 (2007). 
No substantial rights of Hawkins have been prejudiced by the Board's action in this 
matter. The propeliies at issue are designated as an Agriculture area on the zoning map of 
Bonneville County, which allows a dwelling with a minimum lot size of one acre. Comm. 
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R. p. 175; Bonneville County Building and Zoning Ordinance ("BCBZO") § 7-102. For 
approximately ninety (90) years (1910 - 1999) the lefson Homestead had an occupied residence, 
which time period includes time in which Hawkins owned his narrow strip of property that abuts 
the lefson Homestead (Hawkins has owned the narrow strip of property since 1998). Comm. Tr. 
p. 18, 11. 7-21; Board R. pp. 81-84. However, owing to the eruption of a spring on the front 
side of the dwelling, said dwelling was no longer habitable and the Meyers moved the 
d"welling and placed it on moving timbers and bank of dirt where it currently rests. Comm. 
R. p. 22, 11. 9-14. 
For approximately sixty-five (65) years (1936-2001) the Rockwood Parcel had an 
occupied residence, which time period includes time in which Hawkins owned his narrow strip 
of property that abuts the lefson Homestead (Hawkins has owned the narrow strip of property 
since 1998). Comm. Tr. p. 6, 11. 8-25, p. 7,11. 1-14; Board R. p. 81-84. However, due to the 
dwelling's proximity to Canyon Creek, the dwelling is in a flood plain and must be removed. 
Comm. R. p. 8. 11. 4-9. 
Thus, the variance requested (to replace the two homes on the two different parcels 
of land) does not change the zoning of the properties, does not change how the propel1ies 
have been used for approximately ninety (90) and sixty-five (65) years respectively, does not 
change the zoning of Hawkins' property, does not affect how Hawkins uses his property (as 
the variance merely maintains the status quo on how the other properties have been 
historically used); does not restrict Hawkins' development of his propeliy; and does not 
restrict Hawkins' access to his property. In shOl1, no substantial rights of Hawkins are even 
being affected by this variance let alone being prejudiced. All that the variance 
RESPONDENT BONNEVILLE COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONER'S BRIEF - 8 
accomplishes is maintenance of the status quo; which is that the two parcels of property 
which have always had dwellings on them may continue to have dwellings on them. 
Therefore. Hawkins Petition for Judicial Review should be denied because no substantial 
rights of Hawkins have been prejudiced by the Board's action in this matter. 
B. Hawkins contention that the Board erred in Evaluating the Meyers' 
Nonconforming use under an "intent to abandon" rather than a 
"discontinuance" standard is of no relevance in this matter because the 
existence of dwellings on the parcels of property has never been and is not 
now a nonconforming use under the Bonneville County Zoning & Building 
Ordinance. 
Chapter 7 of the BCZBO, enacted in 1959, applies to the agriculture zone covering the 
Meyers' real property at issue in this matter. Section 1-702 of the BCZBO states in pertinent 
part: "The following shall be permitted in the A-I Agricultural Zone: 4.(a) Dwelling with a 
minimum lot size of one acre ... " The Idaho Supreme Court has held that: "'Nonconforming 
llse' means use of land which lawfully existed prior to the enactment of a zoning ordinance and 
which is maintained after the effective date of the ordinance even though not in compliance with 
llse restrictions." Baxter v. City of Preston, 115 Idaho 607, 608-609, 768 P.2d 1340, 1341-42 
(1989). Hawkins argues that per BCZBO § 1-203 the Meyers alleged discontinued use of the 
dwellings on their two parcels of property should now preclude them from building new 
dwellings on the property. 
However, BCZBO § 1-203 only applies "[i]f a nonconforming use of land ... is 
discontinued for one (1) year or more". BCZBO § 1-203 has no applicability in this matter 
because the fact that the Meyers have had dwellings on the two parcels of property has never 
been and is not now a nonconforming use. As set forth above, BCZBO § 1-702 specifically 
allows use of agricultural land for a dwelling with a minimum lot size of one acre. The only 
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"nonconforming" aspect of planned dwellings on the Meyers' two parcels of property is the one 
hundred (100) feet of frontage on an approved County road, not the fact that there are dwellings 
on the property. The variance granted by the Board was relief from the road frontage 
requirement, it was not a variance to allow building of dwellings on agricultural land because 
such use is now and always has been a conforming use. Comm. R. p. 177; Board R. p. 136. 
Thus, 1lawkins' attempt to contend that the existence of the dwellings on the agriculture land was 
a nonconforming use and apply the provisions of BCZBO § 1-201 is without merit because the 
existence of the dwellings on the Meyers' property was never a nonconforming use of the land. 
Accordingly, the decision of the Board to grant the Meyers request for a variance should be 
affirmed. 
Even assuming, for purposes of argument only, that BCZBO § 1-203 has some relevance 
in the matter at hand there is no question that an intent to abandon standard has been utilized by 
Bonneville County when considering discontinuance under BCZBO § 1-203. As set forth above, 
the Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly held: "Planning and zoning decisions are entitled to a 
strong presumption of validity, including the agency's application and interpretation of its 
own zoning ordinances. Neighbors/or a Healthy Gold Fork v. Valley County, 145 Idaho 12L 
176 P.3d 126, 131 (2007) (citing Cowan, 143 Idaho at 508, 148 P.3d at 1254) (emphasis 
added). 
One of the specific discussions by the Bonneville County Board of Adjustments (which 
was adopted and incorporated as an integral part of the Board of Commissioner's October 5, 
2007 Findings of Fact, Conclusion and Decision) was: 
The board reviewed replacement of a home owned by the Byrnes near Ririe that 
did not have frontage on a county approved road. The house had burned down 
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approximately 10 years earlier and the board reviewed the right to rebuild even 
though it was past the one year time period. The board determined that there 
was no intent to abandon this property. The intent to abandon must be 
proven and not simply non-use of the property. The board did not require the 
Byrnes to rebuild a duplicate of the burned structure. 
Comm. R. p. 177 (emphasis added). 
Thus, it is clear that Bonneville County has applied and interpreted BCZBO § 1-203 as 
being subject to an intent to abandon standard. What Hawkins is asking this Court to do is force 
the County to apply and interpret BCZBO § 1-203 inconsistently and differently than it has in the 
past and to conform with his personal interpretation of the ordinance. However, such a request 
must be denied because an agency's application and interpretation of its own ordinances are 
entitled to a strong presumption of validity. Further, abandonment signifies an intent to give up a 
right of use shown by evidence of both (1) intent, and (2) some act or failure to act indicating the 
relinquishment of a right. "Intent cannot be infened by non-use alone." 83 ANJUR.2D Zoning 
and Planning § 611. At no time have the Meyers expressed or implied an intent to abandon 
using the Jefson Homestead and the Rockwood Parcels for dwellings. Comm. R. p. 175; Comm 
Tr. p. 20, II. 1-3; Board R. p. 137. 
In short, the Meyers' planned construction of dwellings on their propeliy is a conforming 
use because their land qualifies for use of dwellings thus precluding any application of BCZBO § 
1-203. However, even assuming BCZBO § 1-203 is examined it is clear that in other matters 
involving said section the County has applied an intent to abandon standard and the evidence is 
overwhelming that the Meyers have never abandoned the use of their land for dwellings. 
Accordingly, the October 5,2007 Findings of Fact, Conclusions and Decision of the Board 
should be affirmed. 
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C. The Board never found that the Spur Road was a County Road in this 
proceeding; the Board merely commented on the evidence presented about 
the Spur Road and found that such evidence was further evidence of special 
circumstances that justified the granting of a variance. 
Hawkins spends a great deal of time and effort alleging that the Board declared that 
the spur road in this case was a County road. However, such a contention is a red herring. If 
the Board had declared or found that the spur road was in fact a County road there would 
have been no need to grant the Meyers a variance because the spur road would have 
provided the required road frontage. However, the Board did approve the variance and 
nowhere in its decision did it declare that the spur road was a county road. What the Board 
actually stated in its October 5,2007 Findings of Fact, Conclusions and Decision \vas the 
following: 
Based on the evidence submitted it would appear that the Board of 
Adjustment conclusion that the alignments of Bone Road have been modified 
over time and that based on new evidence that the spur road which runs to the 
west of from Bone Road also existed. There was no evidence submitted that 
these two roads were ever formally abandoned. These facts alone would 
justify the granting of this variance. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Based upon the testimony and the evidence submitted it is the opinion of this 
Commission that the findings of the Board of adjustment were proper and that 
the variance was properly granted. The evaluation of the case in the Board of 
Adjustments findings was validated and reinforced with the documents and 
affidavits submitted by the Meyers. 
Board R. p. 137. 
BCZBO § 1-707 states in full: "The minimum width of any lot on which a dwelling 
is situated shall be one hundred (100) feet along a county approved road." Idaho Code § 67-
6516 provides in pertinent part: 
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part: 
A variance is a modification of the bulk and placement requirements of the 
ordinance as to lot size, lot coverage, width, depth, front yard, side yard, rear 
yard, setbacks, parking space, height of buildings, or other ordinance 
provision affecting the size or shape of a structure or the placement of the 
structure upon lots, or the size of lots. 
Variances are also provided for in the BCZBO. BCZBO § 1-511 states in pe11inent 
Before a variance can be granted, the Board of Adjustment must find upon the 
evidence that: 
(a) Special circumstances do actually attach to the particular property 
covered by the application which do not generally to the other 
properties in the same zone. 
(b) Because of some special circumstances the appellant's property is 
deprived of privileges possessed by the properties in the same zone. 
(c) The granting of such variance will not substantially affect the 
comprehensive plan of zoning in the county. 
(d) Adherence to the strict letter of the ordinance will cause difficulties 
and hardships, the imposition of which is Ulmecessary in order to carry 
out the purposes of the zoning plan. 
(e) The hardship is not the result of any action by the prope11y owner 
taken after the effective date of this ordinance. 
1. Special Circumstances 
In accordance with the above authorities, it was within the power of the Board to 
grant a variance from the width requirements of BCZBO § 1-707. Both the Commission and 
the Board found that special circumstances do actually attach to the Meyers' property 
covered by the frontage requirement which do not apply generally to the other properties in 
the same zone. The special circumstances include but are not limited to the following: 
The J efson Homestead and Rockwood Parcel have had dwellings since 1910 and 
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1936, respectfully. The Meyers presented evidence in the form of several sworn affidavits 
attesting to the fact that the original Bone Store was located south and west of the existing 
Bone Store and that when the original Bone Store was operating, a public access road ran 
along the front of the store and that the spur road was a public access road servicing the 
school and houses west of the original Bone Store. Board R. pp. 29-41. The Meyers also 
presented evidence that sometime in the late 1950's Bonneville County changed the course 
of the Bone Road near the original Bone Store resulting in movement of the road eastward. 
Coml11. R. p. 19,11. 10-12. Consequently, the 1efson Homestead lost its road frontage 
property and a gap of land was created between the new Bone Road and the old road, store, 
school, and spur road. Comm. R. p. 19, 11. 10-21. Access to the dwelling on the Rockwood 
Parcel has always been by way of the spur road. Comm. R. p. 178. 
Additionally, the Meyers presented Idaho TranspOliation Depalil11ent road 
maintenance maps for 1961, which showed that the spur road was designated as part of 
Bonneville County's public road system and according to Bonneville County records the 
spur road was never vacated/abandoned. Board R. p. 50; Board Tr. p. 93, 11. 1-20. Since the 
movement of the Bone Road, the spur road continued to be used by the public and 
landovvners to access the dwellings on the lefson Homestead and Rockwood Parcel and the 
Meyers have used the spur road for ingress and egress to the dwellings and farm ground 
since acquiring ownership to the properties. 
Further, the Meyers' parcels of land are special in that they were developed and 
dwellings were constructed on them prior to the effective date ofthe BCZBO, meaning that 
there exists an established right to have dwellings upon the parcels even if they do not 
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comply with every standard in the BCZBO. The dwellings themselves are an allowed use 
on the land and therefore it cannot be said that the dwellings are a nonconforming use. In 
fact the parcels comply with every pmi of the BCZBO except for one item, the lack of 
frontage on an approved maintained road (which might not even be true per the evidence 
submitted regarding the spur road). 
The Commission and Board (adopting the Commission's Report of Findings and 
Decision) specifically found that the foregoing facts and issues were special to the Meyers' 
property that do not apply generally to the other properties in the same zone. Comm. R. p. 
178; Board R. p. 136. It is in instances like this that variances were created and are allowed, 
i.e. a variance is only sought when an exception to the BCZBO is needed. Clearly, the 
Board's findings (based upon the substantial and competent evidence presented as set forth 
above) support their determination and finding that special circumstances attach to the 
Meyers' property which do not apply generally to the other properties in the same. 
2. Deprivation of Rights/Privileges Possessed by Properties in Same Zone 
Both the Commission and the Board found that because of the special circumstances 
identified above, the Meyers' property would be deprived of privileges possessed by 
properties in the same zone. Namely, the Meyers' parcels of property would be deprived of 
the privilege and right of having dwellings located on them, which right and privilege is 
possessed by properties in the same zone and has been a right and privilege exercised by the 
parcels since 1910 and 1936 respectfully. 
3. Bonneville County Comprehensive Plan 
The Commission and the Board found that the Comprehensive Plan of Bonneville 
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County will not be substantially affected by granting the variance because the existence of 
d'wellings on the Meyers' parcels of land is a conforming use for their property and such use 
has existed since 1910 and 1936 respectfully. The Commission and Board also found that 
there were ver.y few parcels in the County that would have the same conditions of the parcels 
at issue in this case and as such would not substantially affect the Comprehensive Plan or the 
zoning in the County. 
4. Difficulties and Hardships 
The Commission and Board found that adherence to the strict letter of the BCZBO 
was not necessary in this case to protect the purpose of the zoning plan. The Commission 
and Board point out that the dwellings existed on the parcels long before the adoption of the 
Comprehensive Plan. In addition, strict adherence to the letter of the BCZBO would cause 
difficulties and hardships, namely it would prevent the Meyers from el1joying the right and 
privileges associated to the land which have been enjoyed for years and will prevent the 
Meyers from enjoying the same rights and privileges enjoyed by properties in the same zone. 
5. Hardship was not created by the Meyers 
The Commission and Board specifically found that the hardship in this matter was 
not created or the result of any action taken by owner of the property. The Commission 
stated: 
It was created by two events: (1) the realignment and movement of Bone 
Road, and (2) the adoption of the Zoning Ordinance after the uses were 
already established. The county might have taken the frontage away from one 
of the parcels without having held a road vacation hearing. 
Coml11. R. p. 178. 
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In addition, the only reason the Meyers needed to seek the variance for the building 
of two new dw"ellings on the parcels was because: (1) The eruption of a spring on the front 
side of the dwelling on the lefson Homestead, making said dwelling no longer habitable 
Comm. R. p. 22, 11. 9-14; and (2) The fact that the dwelling on the Rockwood Parcel is 
located in a t100d plain and must be removed. Comm. R. p. 8,11. 4-9. Neither of these 
hardships was caused by the Meyers. 
Thus, both the Commission and Board found substantial and competent evidence 
which satisfied the requirements for a variance and therefore granted the variance. The 
decision to grant the variance is entitled to a strong presumption of validity and accordingly 
should be should be upheld by this Court. 
D. Any argument concerning a regulatory taking in this matter is not ripe and 
therefore nonjusticiable. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has stated: 
We deem it necessary to consider an issue not presented by the parties. 
Though neither party has argued the issue, ripeness is a prerequisite to 
justiciability and we cannot ignore it. See United States v. Antelope, 395 F.3d 
1128, 1132 (9th Cir. 2005). Generally speaking, where a zoning ordinance 
includes a procedure for obtaining a variance from the prescribed 
requirements, a regulatory takings claim is not ripe until the landowner has 
requested and been denied the variance. Williamson Planning Comm 'n v. 
Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 187-88, 105 S.Ct. 3108, 3116-17, 87 L.Ed.2d 
126, l39-40 (1985). 
City o.fCoeur d'Alene v. Simpson, 142 Idaho 839, 845, 136 P.3d 310,316 (2006) (emphasis 
added). 
In this case, the Meyers requested a variance and were granted a variance, the 
principal reason being that the Commission and Board determined upon the evidence 
presented that special circumstances attached to the Meyers' propeliy which did not apply 
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generally to the other properties in the same zone as set forth in section C of this brief above. 
Com111. R. p. 178, Board R. p. 136. There has been no denial of a variance in this matter and 
therefore per the Idaho Supreme COUli's statement in Simpson a regulatory taking analysis in 
this matter is not ripe and therefore not properly brought before this Court at this time. 
In sum, the Meyers' applied for a variance and were granted a variance in this matter 
because both the Commission and the Board found that the evidence presented met the 
prerequisites for granting a variance as set forth in the BCZBO. While both the Commission 
and Board reference a taking of land rights in their decisions, such statements are mere 
obiter dictum and were not necessary to their ultimate decision for granting the variance, 
which was based upon the existence of special circumstances outlined previously. No 
regulatory analysis was undeliaken by the Commission or Board and since the variance was 
granted the issue of regulatory takings is not ripe now and therefore is nonjusticiable. 
E. The Board had authority to allow entirely new structures without placement 
or size limitations because the nonconformance in this case ,vas road 
frontage not the dwellings themselves. 
BCZBO § 1-201 states in pertinent paJi: "no nonconforming use of buildings, 
structures or land shall be extended or enlarged." BCZBO § 1-202 states in paJi: "no permit 
shall be issued which will have the effect of increasing the floor space devoted to the 
nonconforming use ... " In this case, the nonconforming use is the lack of one hundred (100) 
feet of County road frontage. The dwellings on the Meyers' parcels of property are 
conforming uses, as the BCZBO specifically allows dwellings on property zoned 
Agricultural as the Meyers' propeliy. BCZBO § 1-702. Thus, it is the land itself not the 
dwellings on the land which cause the nonconforming use. The Commission (and the Board 
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adopting and incorporating the Commission's decision) recognized this when it concluded: 
Regarding Section 1-201, the new buildings should be allowed. The 
non-conforming use of the buildings, structures or land would not be extended 
or enlarged by allowing new buildings on the parcels. Rather, the structures 
and the land would still be used for residential purposes, and there is no intent 
to enlarge or extend the size of the non-conforming parcels of land. 
Regarding Section 1-202, the non-conforming use is not limited to 
repairs or to the same footprint. The land, not the buildings, are in non-
conformance due to the lack of road frontage. 
Comm. R. p. 177. 
Thus, by granting the Meyers application for a variance (which variance relates 
solely to the road frontage provision because the dwellings themselves are a conforming use) 
the nonconformance, the road frontage, is not being enlarged or expanded because the land 
itself is not being enlarged or extended. In addition, BCZBO § 1-202 is not violated in this 
case because the dwellings in this matter are a conforming use of the propeliy and therefore 
there is no increase of floor space devoted to a nonconforming use. Accordingly, Hawkins 
contention that the Board had no authority to allow the new structures and that it ignored 
BCZBO §§ 1-201, 1-202 is without merit and the Court should uphold the Board's decision 
to grant the Meyers' application for a variance. 
CONCLUSION 
Hawkins Petition for Judicial Review should be denied solely on the basis that no 
su bstantial rights of Hawkins have been prejudiced by the Board's action in this matter. The 
Board's action does not affect the zoning of Hawkins' property, does not affect Hawkins' access 
to his property, does not afTect Hawkins' development of his property, does not affect Hawkins' 
use of property, and merely maintains the status quo, which is the Jefson Homestead and 
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Rockwood Parcel may continue to have dwellings upon them as they have since 1910 and 1936 
respectfully. 
The Court defers to the agency's findings of fact unless they are 
clearly erroneous; and the agency's factual determinations are binding on the 
reviewing court, even when there is conflicting evidence before the agency, so 
long as the determinations are supported by evidence in the record. 
Spencer l'. Kootenai County, 145 Idaho 448, _,180 P.3d 487,491 (2008) (citations 
omitted). 
"[P]lanning and zoning decisions are entitled to a strong presumption of validity; this 
includes the board's application and interpretation of their own zoning ordinances." 
Cml'an v. Board o/ColJ1missioners (~fFremont County, 143 Idaho 501,508, 148 P.3d 1247, 
1254 (2006) (citations omitted). 
In this case, the Meyers presented substantial and competent evidence to both the 
Commission and Board in support of their application for a variance. The only variance sought 
in this matter was relief from the road frontage provision because the dwellings located on the 
properties were and are a conforming use. Evidence showed that one of the Meyers' parcels 
(Jefson Homestead) did in fact have the required road frontage at one time, however, due to the 
County moving Bone Road such road frontage was taken away. Evidence also showed that the 
other parcel (the Rockwood Parcel) had a dwelling on it since 1936 and that the spur road which 
has always provided access to the parcel might be a public road which provides the necessary 
frontage. Nevertheless, the right to have a dwelling on the parcel was established before 
enactment of the BCBZO. Further, the Meyers never intended to abandon the dwellings located 
on their two parcels of property. Based upon the evidence presented, both the Commission and 
the Board determined that the Meyers had met the requirements for a variance as set forth by 
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Idaho statute and the BCZBO and therefore granted the same. 
As Idaho law has repeatedly held, planning and zoning decisions are entitled to a strong 
presumption of validity, including the application and interpretation of their own zoning 
ordinances. Therefore, based upon the record before the Court and arguments presented herein 
the Board respectfully requests that this Court affirm the decision of the Board granting the 
Meyers application for a variance. 
DATED this /(J day of October, 2008. 
ANDERSON NELSON HALL SMITH, P.A. 
~G.HAL'L 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
INRE: 
Application for a Variance to Validate the 
Right to Replace a Single Family 
Dwelling on Parcels Without the Required 
100' of Road Frontage. 
STAN HAWKINS, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
BONNEVILLE COUNTY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS, acting as a Board of 
Adjustment. 
Respondent, 
v. 
DALE AND MARLA MEYER, husband 
and wife, 
Applicants. 
Case No. CV-07-6123 
PETITIONER'S REPLY BRIEF 
ORIGINAL 
COMES NOW, the Petitioner, Stan Hawkins, and submits the following 
Memorandum Brief in response to Respondent's Brief dated October 10,2008. 
I. 
ARGUMENT 
1. Standard of Review 
A. The Commissioners' Conclusions of Law are Reviewed De Novo. 
Respondent argues that this Court should "defer to the agency's findings of fact 
unless they are clearly erroneous." Respondent's Brief at 6. In making such argument, 
Respondent misconstrues the Petitioner's challenges here as challenging the Commissioners' 
factual findings. Such is simply not the case. All ofthe challenges raised by Petitioner focus 
upon the County Commissioners' erroneous interpretation of the non-conforming use and 
variance provisions of the Bonneville County Zoning Ordinance (the "BCZBO") and upon 
the County's inordinate determination that the dirt lane across Petitioner's property was a 
county road, the existence of which justified the Board's issuance of the variance. All of 
these issues are questions of law and as such are entitled to no deference whatsoever. 
When reviewing a land use decision, "The Board of Commissioners is treated as a 
government agency." Cowan v. Bd. of Comm 'rs of Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501, 508, 
148 P.3d 1247, 1254 (2006). Unlike its findings of fact, the Board's conclusions oflaw are 
entitled to no deference whatsoever, rather Idaho courts "exercise free review over the 
agency's conclusions of law." Matter of Russet Valley Produce, Inc., 127 Idaho 654, 904 
P.2d 556 (1995). Moreover, the Idaho Supreme Court has made it clear that a county's 
"[ e ]rroneous conclusions of law may be corrected on appeal," regardless of any deference 
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accorded to factual findings by the agency. Allen v. Blaine County, 131 Idaho 138, 141, 953 
P.2d 578, 581 (1998). Here Petitioner is challenging the Board's conclusions oflaw and as 
such, the Board's conclusions are freely reviewable and entitled to no deference from this 
Court. 
B. The Board's Interpretation of its Own Ordinances is a Question of Law. 
Respondent also argues that the Board's interpretation of its zoning ordinance is 
entitled to deference. Respondent's Briefat 10. However, in this regard the Idaho Supreme 
Court has stated that "[i]nterpretation of an ordinance, like construction of a statute, is an 
issue of law and therefore an appellate court exercises free review." Friends of Farm to 
Market v. Valley County, 137 Idaho 192, 196, 46 P.3d 9, 13 (2002). For the reasons 
explained more fully in Section 3(A) below, the Board's interpretation of the BCBZO was 
clearly erroneous and such interpretation is freely reviewable by this Court as a matter oflaw. 
In this case, the Board relied on three key conclusions oflaw in its decision to approve 
the Mevers' variance. First, that an "intent to abandon," rather than a "discontinuance" 
standard was the proper way to analyze the non-conforming use provisions found in § 1-203 
ofthe BCBZO. Second, that the Meyers' proposed residential use in an agricultural zone, 
without the frontage required under BCBZO § 1-707, was a "special circumstance" justifying 
issuance of a variance from the non-conforming use provisions, because the spur road was 
a county road. Finally, the Board concluded that Meyers should be granted a variance 
because of "special circumstances" associated with the County's alleged relocation ofthe old 
Bone store frontage road, notwithstanding that the Meyers caused the need for the variance 
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(i.e. their failure to maintain non-conforming use status and their desire to enlarge and 
relocate the old ranch houses). Had the Meyers maintained their non-conforming use of the 
two ranch houses and been content to reside within the existing structures, the parties would 
not be before the Court today. 
All of the Board's conclusions are conclusions oflaw and as such are entitled to no 
deference. Because the Board's conclusions were erroneous in numerous respects and 
because the material facts are undisputed, this Court should reverse the Board's decision and 
deny the variance as a matter of law. 
2. Mr. Hawkins has Standing to Bring this Petition Because He is an "Affected 
Person" Within the Meaning of the Statute and the Board's Decision Prejudices 
his "Substantial Rights." 
Respondent asserts that "[n]o substantial rights of Hawkins have been prejudiced by 
the Board's action in this matter." Respondent's Brief at 7. Respondent has obviously never 
experienced the maddening frustration of spending countless hours trying to round up 
hundreds of head of cattle scattered across the hills of Bone, as a result of a careless 
teenager's failure to close the gate. That circumstance is a very real possibility should 
Meyers be granted the right to build two new residences, both of which necessarily would 
derive gated access across Petitioner's ranch property. (See Comm. R. p. 68, LL. 3-6 and 
p. 80, LL. 2-4, where Petition testified that the installation of a gate was necessary because 
he uses the property to graze livestock.) Aside from the foregoing possibility, Petitioner 
would have standing if for no other reason than the variance expanded the existing access 
across his property from a somewhat infrequent agricultural use to a daily, year-round 
residential use. 
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In making its standing argument, Respondent ignores two fundamental facts. First, 
the Board's granting of the variance altered the status quo (i.e. granted a residential use 
where none existed before) and secondly, in so doing significantly expanded the scope and 
the impact of the use of the spur road upon Hawkins' property. Specifically, Respondent 
argues that the variance merely maintains the status quo "which is that two parcels of 
property which have always had dwellings on them may continue to have dwellings on 
them." Respondent's Briefat 9. Respondent's argument however ignores the current status 
quo - that is there is currently no residential use of the single lane farm access road crossing 
Hawkin's property-a circumstance that has existed since at least 200 1 and probably longer. 
To argue that the variance did not change the status quo, simply ignores the Meyers' 
testimony that they had abandoned one of the ranch houses because of its state of disrepair 
and that they had not used the other since 2001. Comm. Tr. p. 26, L. 14-15. 
More importantly, the Board's decision significantly alters the scope and frequency 
of Meyers , use of the spur road. Currently, the spur road is used for agricultural purposes, 
primarily during the Spring planting season and during the Fall harvest. The Board's 
variance decision will now allow daily use ofthe road on a year round basis. Respondent's 
argument simply ignores that the use of the spur road will change from infrequent 
agricultural use to a daily residential use and from a seasonal agricultural use in the summer 
to year-round access during the winter. Clearly, Mr. Hawkins "substantial rights" have been 
affected by the Board's decision. 
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The LLPUA states that "[a]ny affected person aggrieved by a decision may within 
twenty-eight (28) days ... seek judicial review as provided by chapter 52, title 67, Idaho 
Code." I.C. § 67-6521. As used in the LLUPA, an "affected person" means "one having 
an interest in real property which may be adversely affected by the issuance or denial of a 
permit authorizing the development." Jd. A variance is a permit authorizing development. 
I.e. § 67-6516. 
Idaho cases state that an '" affected person" as "one having an interest in the real 
property which may be adversely affected by the issuance or denial of a permit authorizing 
development." City of Burley v. McCaslin Lumber Co., 107 Idaho 906,908,693 P.2d 1108, 
1110 (Ct.App. 1984). In City of Burley, the court held that a municipality could be an 
aggrieved person within the meaning of the statute merely because it had a general interest 
in the "maintenance and development ofthe city and the property contained therein." Jd. In 
Evans v. Teton County, the court held found that persons with property located 300 feet from 
a proposed subdivision were "affected" under the meaning of the statute, despite the lack of 
any proof of an adverse influence or affect upon the adjoining properties (i.e. a mere 
theoretical adverse effect is sufficient). 139 Idaho 71, 75, 73 P.3d 84, 88 (2003). The court 
there found that even though the landowner's property did not directly adjoin the subdivision, 
the development's mere proximity to the neighboring properties "adversely affected" the 
landowners. Jd. 
In this case, Mr. Hawkins has more than a generalized interest in Meyers' proposed 
development and more than mere proximity to the proposed development, as was the case 
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in the City of Burley and Evans cases. Rather, Mr. Hawkins has a concrete and tangible 
interest in the increased frequency and lengthened time within which traffic will cross his 
land via the spur road. Unlike the petitioner in Evans, here Hawkins' property directly abuts 
the property to be developed and all traffic originating therefrom will necessarily traverse 
Petitioner's property once the new dwellings are constructed. Board R. p. 50. 
In Davisco Foods International, Inc. v. Gooding County, the Idaho Supreme Court 
held that a property owner who "live[ d] approximately 3.4 miles from the Project site" had 
standing to appeal the decision of a county commission. 141 Idaho 784, 786, 118 P .3d 116, 
118 (2005). The court there found that the mere possibility that an odor from the proposed 
wastewater processing facility might be detected on landowners' distant property was 
sufficient to devalue their property in a way that made them "adversely affected" for standing 
purposes. l Id. at 787, 118 P.2d at 119. "[T]he Archibalds may be able to smell odors from 
the Project on their property. This is sufficient for the Board to determine that the 
Archibalds' property interest 'may be adversely affected' if the special use permit is 
granted." Id. (emphasis added). 
Unlike the 3.4 mile distance at issue in Gooding County, here Mr. Hawkins' property 
directly adjoins the subject property and will bear the brunt of the traffic originating 
therefrom. And, unlike the potential harm the court countenanced in the Gooding case, here 
the harm is not speculative; if the variance is affirmed, Hawkins' property will be affected 
lAlthough the court was evaluating standing under the Gooding County Ordinance, rather than the LLUPA, the 
language used to confer standing was nearly identical to LLUPA's language: "one who has an interest in real property which may 
be adversely affected" by the issuance of a permit. Gooding County, 141 Idaho at 786, 118 P.3d at 118; I.e. § 67-6521 (I)(a). 
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by increased residential traffic over his property. Far from preserving the status quo, the 
Board's decision significantly alters the manner in which the Meyer's parcels have been used 
in the immediate past and places a new burden on Mr. Hawkins' property- a burden that did 
not exist prior to the granting of the variance. Clearly then, substantial rights of the 
Petitioner have been prejudiced and as such Petitioner has standing under Idaho Code § 67-
5279(4). 
3. The Board Erred in Applying an "Intent to Abandon" Rather Than a 
"Discontinuance" Standard to the Meyers' Nonconforming Residential Use. 
A. Where the Language of an Ordinance is Unambiguous There is no Occasion 
to Employ Principles of Statutory Construction and no Reason to Defer to the 
Board's Interpretation of the Ordinance. 
Respondent argues that because the Board has applied an "intent to abandon" standard 
when interpreting BCBZO § 1-203 in the past, the Court should defer to the Board's 
interpretation in this case. Respondent's Brief at p. 11. In essence, Respondent argues that 
because the Board has erred in the past, the Court should countenance continued error in the 
future. The illogic of that argument is readily apparent. 
Respondent further contends that "an agency's application and interpretation of its 
own ordinances are entitled to a strong presumption of validity." Respondent's Brief at p. 
11. However, there is no reason for the agency to "interpret" an ordinance if its language is 
clear. In this case, the "discontinuance" language is unambiguous. Thus, the Court should 
not defer to the Board's erroneous interpretation of the BCBZO and should apply it exactly 
as it is written. 
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Idaho courts "exercise free review over whether an agency's interpretation of a statute 
[and whether such interpretation] should be afforded ... deference." Hayden Lake Fire 
Protection Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 388, 398, 111 P.3d 73, 83 (2005). Importantly, the 
Idaho Supreme Court has indicated that deference is appropriate only where the language of 
the statute is unclear. However, if the language is unambiguous, the Court need only apply 
it as written: 
[IJf the language is unambiguous, an agency's interpretation 
contrary to the plain meaning of a statute will not be given 
deference. If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, 
statutory construction is unnecessary and this Court need merely 
apply the statute. 
Hamilton ex rei. Hamilton v. Reeder Flying Service, 135 Idaho 568, 572,21 P.3d 890, 894 
(2001) (citations omitted) (emphasis added); accord, Ackerman v. Bonneville County, 140 
Idaho 307,92 P.3d 557 (Ct.App. 2004) (citation omitted) ("If the statutory language is clear 
and unambiguous, statutory construction is unnecessary and this Court need merely apply the 
statute."); Robison v. Bateman-Hall, Inc., 139 Idaho 207,76 P.3d 951 (2003) (citations 
omitted) ("Where the language of a statute is clear, this Court need only apply the statutory 
language to the facts at hand."); Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71, 77, 73 P.3d 84, 90 
(2003) (citations omitted) ("If an ordinance is unambiguous, this Court need not consider 
rules of statutory construction and the statute will be given its plain meaning."); The Senator, 
Inc. v. Ada County, Bd. of Equalization, 138 Idaho 556, 575, 67 P.3d45, 54 (2003) (Kidwell, 
J., dissenting) (citations omitted) ("If a statute is clear, this Court need not engage in an 
exercise of statutory construction. The statute will be given its plain meaning."). 
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In this case, the Board has not established any ambiguity. The Board merely adopted 
the Board of Adjustment's presumptive statement that "intent to abandon must be proven and 
not simply non-use of the property." Comm. R. p. 177. Respondent points to no ambiguity 
which would necessitate statutory construction or "interpretation." Because there is no 
ambiguity in the ordinance, it was inappropriate for the Board interpret the ordinance, and 
the Board's interpretation is entitled to no deference whatsoever. It should have been applied 
as written. 
B. The BCBZO Unambiguously States That Nonconforming Uses Lose Protection 
When "Discontinued. " 
Because the language ofthe BCBZO is unambiguous, this Court need only look to the 
language of the statute and give the text its plain meaning. The ordinance says that lawfully 
existing nonconforming uses lose their "grandfathered" protection of nonconforming use 
status and must completely comply with all provisions zoning ordinance when the 
nonconforming use "is discontinued for a period of one (l) year or more." BCBZO § 1-203, 
(emphasis added). The ordinance could not be any more clear and this Court should give 
effect to the words of the ordinance exactly as written. Equally important, the Court should 
give not add words which are not in the ordinance (i.e. intent to abandon). 
The drafters, had they wanted, could have included an abandonment standard, but did 
not for good reason. As noted in the case authorities cited in Petitioners' earlier brief, use 
of an abandonment standard encourages perjury and makes elimination of non-conforming 
uses much more difficult. See e.g. Hartleyv. City of Colorado Springs, 764 P.2d 1216, 1225 
(Colo. 1988). Public policy favors the eventual elimination of nonconforming uses and Idaho 
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Courts have repeatedly endorsed and upheld this policy. See, e.g., Bastian v. City a/Twin 
Falls, 104 Idaho 307, 309, 658 P.2d 978, 980 (Ct.App. 1983) (citations omitted) ("[T]he 
public policy embodied in zoning laws 'dictates the firm regulation of nonconforming uses 
with a view to their eventual elimination. "'). A simple "discontinuance" rather than an 
"intent to abandon" standard best effectuates this public policy. See also Lessard v. Burnett 
County Ed. 0/ Adjustment, 256 Wis.2d 821, 835, 649 N.W.2d 728, 735 (Wis.App. 2002) 
("[T]he question of voluntary intent is irrelevant where the cessation of the nonconforming 
use has endured for the requisite time under the ordinance." ) Id. at 837,649 N.W.2d at 736. 
In sum, the Board patently erred when it injected an intent requirement into its 
analysis of BCBZO § 1-203 and as such its decision should be reversed as a matter of law. 
C. The Board's Decision Should be Reversed as a Matter a/Law Because Meyers 
Admitted They Discontinued the Residential Use a/Both Properties/or More 
Than One Year. 
There is absolutely no dispute that the Meyers discontinued the residential use of their 
property for more than one year-Meyers admitted as much. At the hearing before the 
Commission, the Meyers forthrightly admitted that residential use of the property had been 
discontinued for a period of more than one year. Specifically, Marla Meyer admitted that 
"nobody has lived in the [Jefson] home, not for - - oh, probably - - probably 10 years or 
more." Comm. Tr. p. 26, L. 16-17. The last tenant living in the Rockwood house "moved 
out in the fall of 2001." Comm. Tr. p. 6, L. 18-19. There has been no residential use of 
either parcel since that time. 
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The evidence that the parcels have not been used for residential purposes for more 
than one year is not disputed by either party. Thus, regardless of what the Meyers may have 
subjectively intended with regard to their property, it is undisputed that the Meyers' 
residential use of the parcels has been discontinued for a period well in excess ofthe one year 
set forth in the non-conforming use provisions of the BCBZO. The Board clearly erred in 
finding that BCBZO § 1-203 was inapplicable in this case and this Court should reverse the 
Board's decision and find that the Meyers' non-conforming use has lapsed as a matter o flaw . 
No purpose would be served by a remand, since there is no dispute that Meyers' use was 
discontinued for a period greater than one year.2 
4. The Board Erred in Finding That the Variance was Properly Granted. 
A. Contrary to Respondent's Contention, the Board Relied upon the Alleged 
Status o/the Spur Road as a County Road in Granting the Variance. 
Respondent argues that the status of the spur road as a county road is a "red herring" 
because the Board "no where in its decision ... declare [ d] that the spur road was a county 
road." Respondent's Brief at 12. In making that argument, Respondent misses the thrust of 
Petitioner's argument. Here, Petitioner does not directly challenge the County's unlawful 
declaration of the spur road as a county road. Rather Petitioner challenges the Board's 
determination that the spur road was a county road and its reliance upon such status as a 
county road as a "special circumstance" justifying the granting of the variance. Specifically, 
the Board made the following finding in its October 5,2007, decision: 
2 The same thing is true of Meyer's eligibility for a variance. Since the record reflects without dispute that loss of the nOI1-
conforming use status of the old ranch houses was attributable to Meyers' decision to discontinue use ofthe two dilapidated ranch houses and to 
build two new ones, it fo1tows that they are not eligible for a variance, since the need for the variance was self-caused. See § 1-511 (3)(e), 
BCBZO. Such issue can likewise be decided as a matter of law. 
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Based on the evidence submitted, it would appear that the Board 
of Adjustment conclusion that the alignments of Bone Road 
have been modified over time and based on new evidence that 
the spur road which runs to the west of the Bone Road also 
existed. There was no evidence submitted that these two roads 
were ever formally abandoned. These/acts alone wouldjust the 
granting a/this variance. 3 
Board R. at 137. (emphasis added)4 
From the foregoing finding, it is clear that the Board concluded that the frontage road 
and spur road were county roads, neither of which, according to Mr. Christensen, had been 
"formerly abandoned," thereby constituting a "special circumstance" justifying the grant of 
the variance. The focus of Petitioner's arguments in his opening brief is the Board's failure 
to require proof of a properly conducted statutory validation hearing or of a judicial 
validation declaring the existence of such public roads and the Board's reliance upon the 
"assumed" status of the spur road as a public road, as the basis for its issuance of the 
variance. 
As was noted in Petitioner's opening brief, when Petitioner challenged the Meyers' 
contention that the spur road's designation as a county road by the State justified the issuance 
of the variance, Commissioner Christensen interjected with a comment that it was 
Petitioner's burden to prove the County had abandoned the spur road as a county road: 
COMMISSIONER CHRISTENSEN: Let me address that. 
*** 
3The "new evidence" was the State Highway road map that was introduced for the first time on appeal to the Board. 
4As noted in Petitioner's opening brief, the Board's logic is very confusing, to say the least. If, as here determined by the Board, the 
frontage road had not been abandoned as a public road, then its relocation (i.e. abandonment) could not serve as a "special circumstance" 
justifying issuance of the variance. Further, if the spur road was indeed still a public road, then there was no need for a variance. In either case, 
the two ranch houses would have met the necessary frontage requirement. 
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You might look at the evidence they've presented, but there was simply no 
record of an abandonment of [the spur road], and simply removing it from a 
map, as I understand, that does not constitute an abandonment. 
Board Tr. p.95, L.11-21. Based upon that erroneous placement of the burden of proof and 
implicit assumption that the spur road had not been "abandoned" as a county road, the Board 
then concluded that such facts alone ''justif[ied] the granting of this variance." See Board 
R. p. 137. 
In sum, contrary to Respondent's argument, the Board in fact relied upon the 
"assumed" status ofthe spur road and frontage road as county roads as a special circumstance 
justifying its grant of the variance. As was argued in Petitioner's Brief, that determination 
was made without any proof of a prior statutory validation or judicial validation or proof that 
either road was ever included as part of the County Road Map. In the absence of such 
evidence, the Board's shifting of the burden of proof upon Petitioner and its reliance upon 
the public status of these two county roads as a basis for its issuance of the variance, were 
erroneous as a matter of law. 
B. The Board Erred in Finding the Existence a/Special Circumstances Justifoing 
the Variance. 
A variance is properly granted only where all the elements of the ordinance 
authorizing the variance are met. I.e. § 67-6516. To grant a variance in this case, each of 
the elements of BCBZO § 1-511 (3) had to be satisfied.s Just as they do with statues, Idaho 
5 BCBZO § 1-511(3) states: "Before a variance can be granted, the Board of Adjustment must find upon the evidence 
before it that: (a) Special circumstances do actually attach to the particular property covered by the application which to not 
apply generally to the other properties in the same zone. (b) Because of some special circumstances the appellant's property is 
deprived of privileges possessed by the properties in the same zone. (c) The granting of such variance will not substantially affect 
the comprehensive plan of zoning in the county. (d) Adherence to the strict letter of the ordinance will cause difficulties and 
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courts exercise "free review" over an agency's application of its own ordinances. State v. 
Doe, 144 Idaho 796, 798, 172 P.3d 551,553 (Ct.App. 2007). In this case the Board erred in 
granting the ordinance because there are no special circumstances justifYing the variance, the 
Meyers' were not deprived of any privileges as a result of the lapse of their non-conforming 
use and the Meyers' need for the variance was self-created. These conclusions are based 
upon the Meyers' own testimony and there is no need to remand the matter for further 
findings. The Court should simply rule that, based upon the Meyers' own testimony, they 
were not entitled to a variance as a matter of law. 
As more fully established in Petitioner's opening brief, there are no special 
circumstances justifying the variance. See Petitioner's Brief at 31-34. Respondent raises 
three theories in support of the Board's issuance of the variance. Respondent's Brief at 14. 
First, Respondent asserts that the frontage road in front of the old Bone store was actually 
a county road which at one point provided the Meyers' parcels with frontage on a county 
road and that the County's alleged relocation of the frontage road was a "special 
circumstance" justifying the issuance of the variance. Respondent's Brief at 14. While the 
Petitioner strongly disagrees with the Board's factual finding regarding the relocation of the 
frontage road, ultimately the Board's finding is irrelevant in light of the uncontested facts 
presented to the Board. The Meyers' testified that the road was moved in 1958. Comm Tr. 
p. 21, L. 22. However, at the Commission hearing, the County's Planning and Zoning 
Administrator forcefully asserted that the frontage requirement was not adopted until 1959. 
hardships, the imposition of which is unnecessary in order to carry out the purposes ofthe zoning plan. (e) The hardship is not 
the result of action by the property owner taken after the effective date ofthis ordinance ... " 
15 - PETITIONER'S REPLY BRIEF 
Comm. Tr. p. 52, L. 22 through p. 54, L. 8. Accepting Meyers' version of the facts, it is 
quite clear that the adoption ofthe frontage requirement by the County was the cause of the 
non-conformity rather than the relocation ofthe county road. Specifically, in 1958, there was 
no frontage requirement and the alleged relocation of the road did not cause the Meyers' 
property to become non-conforming. The property was rendered non-conforming one year 
later when the County adopted the frontage requirement - a circumstance that is no different 
then any other circumstance where non-conformity is caused by the adoption of a zoning 
regulation that is inconsistent with the present use of property. 
In reality, the need for the variance arose, not because of the County's relocation of 
the road, rather it arose because Meyers discontinued occupation of their non-conforming use 
in 2001. Had the Meyers continued use ofthe two dilapidated ranch houses, they would not 
have lost their non-conforming use rights and there would have been no need whatsoever for 
the variance. Such uses could have continued exactly as they were, under the non-
conforming provisions of the County Zoning Ordinance. Respondent's argument simply 
misses the substance and purpose of a variance and attempts to interject the irrelevant 
concept of fault as a factor to weigh in determining whether or not a variance is or is not 
appropriate. As was noted in Petitioner's earlier brief, a governing entity is always "at fault," 
in the sense that the very nature of a non-conforming use stems from non-conformity caused 
by the governmental entity's adoption of a standard that renders the property non-
conforming. Simply stated, the government is always "at fault" in that respect. To premise 
the issuance of a variance upon such fault does nothing more than open the door to the use 
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of the variance provisions in every case to circumvent the non-conforming use provisions of 
the zoning ordinance. If fault were relevant, every non-conforming use would qualify for a 
variance and the non-conforming use provisions would become meaningless. Conversely, 
if indeed fault is a proper consideration, then fault lies at Meyers' feet when they elected to 
discontinue use ofthe two dilapidated ranch houses and expand into two entirely new houses. 
Similarly, Respondent argues that "the Meyers' parcels ofland are special in that they 
were developed and the dwellings were constructed on them prior to the effective date of the 
BCZBO." Respondent's Brief at 14. Such argument is again nothing more than a bootstrap 
to use the variance provisions as a device for circumventing the non-conforming use 
provisions of the BCZBO. Again, if having an "established right" is the only requirement 
for securing a variance from the non-conforming use provisions, then every non-conforming 
use would warrant the issuance of a variance. The existence of a pre-existing lawful use 
rendered non-conforming by a new ordinance is always the case. Once again, Respondent 
is attempting to use the variance provisions to bootstrap its way around and away from the 
enforcement of its own ordinance in accordance with its terms. The "general concept of 
zoning policy [is] that nonconforming uses should not be allowed to expand and eventually 
should be eliminated." Ada County v. Schemm, 96 Idaho 396, 398, 529 P.2d 1268, 1270 
(1974). The Board's decision goes exactly the opposite direction. 
C. The Need/or the Variance Was Caused by the Meyers. 
That the need for the variance was caused by the Meyers is self-evident from the 
record. The Meyers purchased the Jepson parcel in 1972 and the Rockwood parcel was 
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purchased in 2001. Board R. p. 48; Comm. R. p.6, LL 17-25; p. 7, LL 1-3. No one has lived 
in the J efson House for "probably 10 years or more." Comm. Tr. p.25, L.16-17. The 
Rockwood House has been uninhabited since 2001. Comm. Tr. p.6, L.17 -19. Clearly the 
discontinuance of such use occurred during Meyers' watch and such discontinuance is what 
brought the Meyers to the Board of Adjustment. Had they not discontinued their use of the 
two ranch houses, there would have been no need for the variance and quite clearly the 
Meyers would have been able to continue their pre-existing use of the ranch houses under 
the non-conforming use provisions ofthe BCZBO. The realignment of the frontage road had 
nothing to do with the need for the variance; the need for the variance was clearly caused by 
Meyers' failure to maintain their non-conforming use and their desire to enlarge and 
construct two totally new residential structures. 
A variance is not appropriate where the applicant landowner creates the need for the 
variance. BCBZO § 1-511(3)(e). In this case, both justifications for the variance were 
created by the Meyers. Because of the age and condition of the homes, the Meyers initially 
sought to restore the properties, but because of the magnitude of the restoration project, the 
Meyers "lost interest." Comm. Tr. p. 26, L. 14-15. Then the Meyers made the decision to 
discontinue use of the parcels, rather than repair the properties in a timely manner, which 
would have been allowed under BCBZO § 1-202. The Meyers cannot use their own decision 
to discontinue the use of the parcels as justification for a variance-that is exactly what 
BCBZO § 1-511(3)(e) prohibits. 
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Second, the Meyers want to construct new, larger homes in different locations on 
property without the required frontage. Comm. Tr. p. 8, L. 6-7 and p. 99, L. 1-2. Thus, the 
Meyers wish to be excused from the application of BCBZO §§ 1-201, 1-203, and 1-707. 
Nonconforming uses are only protected to the extent that they existed when the zoning 
ordinance was passed. O'Connor v. City of Moscow, 69 Idaho 37, 41, 202 P.2d 401,403 
(1949). Further, "A nonconforming use is not allowed to expand." Taylor v. Ed. of County 
Comm 'rs, 124 Idaho 392, 397,860 P.2d 8,13 (CLApp. 1993). Meyers testified unequivocally 
that they wanted to build larger homes to accommodate larger families. Comm. Tr. p. 98, 
L. 19 through p. 99, L. 3. Their reasons for the variance, that is their desire to expand the size 
of the houses, is entirely self-created and thus cannot justify the variance 
The adoption of the frontage requirement in combination with the alleged relocation 
of the frontage road, cannot serve as a basis for finding a "special circumstance" because 
once adopted, the frontage requirement applied to all county properties-conforming and 
non-conforming alike. In that respect, Meyers were no different than any other property 
owner whose property was rendered non-conforming by that action. To call the adoption of 
the frontage requirement a "special circumstance" is merely a way for the Respondent to do 
an "end run" around compliance with its own ordinance. This is clearly not what the drafters 
of the ordinance intended - they specifically included a provision to address uses which 
became nonconforming because of the adoption of the ordinance. The drafters specifically 
stated that existing nonconforming uses "may be continued to the same extent and character 
as that which existed on the effective date of this ordinance," but that "[n]ew and additional 
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buildings, structures and uses of land must conform to the provisions of this ordinance." 
BCBZO 1-201. Clearly the drafters did not contemplate that the creation of a non-
conforming use could be used as a "special circumstance" justifying the issuance of a 
vanance. 
D. The Meyers are Not Being Deprived of Rights and Privileges Possessed by 
Other Properties in the Same Zone; Rather, the Variance Gives the Meyers 
More Rights and Privileges. 
Respondent argues that unless the variance is granted "the Meyers' parcels of property 
would be deprived of the privilege and right of having dwellings located on them, which 
right and privilege is possessed properties in the same zone." Respondent's Brief at 15. 
Respondent ignores that all residential properties in the A-I Agricultural Zone are subject 
to the frontage requirements of the BCBZO. Far from being deprived of privileges possessed 
by other properties, the Meyers want more privileges than are possessed by other property 
owners in the A-I zone. Specifically, the Meyers want to be excused from complying with 
the frontage requirements of § 1-707, a section which is applicable to every other person 
wishing to construct a dwelling in the agricultural zone. Contrary to Respondent's argument, 
the Meyers are requesting a privilege granted to no other resident of the County - that is the 
right to construct two new residential structures without the required frontage and without 
restriction as to size or location. Inexplicably, the Board seems all together too willing to 
grant such special privileges notwithstanding the unambiguous provisions of its own 
ordinance and the self-evident purpose of the frontage requirement. 6 
6The Board's complacency here is most surprising given the evident purpose of the frontage requirement, to wit: easy access to 
residential structures for fire trucks, ambulances, police vehicles and other public safety equipment. When lives are at stake one would assume 
the Board would be most vigilant. 
20 - PETITIONER'S REPLY BRIEF 
9 
The Meyers also contend that by not being able to construct dwellings they will be 
deprived of a "right and privilege exercised by the parcels since 1910 and 1936." 
Respondent's Brief at 15. This claim ignores the fact that "nonconforming uses have no 
inherent right to be extended or enlarged." Bastian, 104 Idaho at 309,658 P.2d at 980. The 
Meyers' only "right" after the adoption ofthe BCBZO in 1959 was to continue the residential 
use of the structures to the same degree and extent as existed before its adoption. BCBZO 
§ 1-201. They lost that "right" when they ceased using the buildings and opted to construct 
two new, larger residences. 
Because the Meyers were not deprived of rights possessed by other propeliies, the 
Board erred in its determination that variance was properly granted. Further, based upon the 
Meyers' admission that they voluntarily elected to abandon their efforts to restore the 
dilapidated ranch houses and build two entirely new, larger residences, this Court should rule 
as a matter of law that they caused the need for the variance and as such are not eligible for 
a vanance. 
5. The Board Erred in Finding That a Taking of the Meyers' Property 
Would Occur Absent Issuance of a Variance. 
The Respondent argues that any discussion of a taking is "not ripe" and that the 
Board's taking discussion should be considered dictum. Respondent's Brief at 18. This 
assertion mischaracterizes the Board's decision. The Board unequivocally stated that for 
them to not grant the variance "would be a taking of land rights." Board R. p. 136. 
Obviously then one of the motivating factors behind the Board's decision to grant the 
variance was its erroneous belief that its failure to do so would precipitate a "taking." 
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Clearly this issue was a significant factor driving the Board's decision and as such it is 
appropriately before the Court in this Petition for Judicial Review, regardless of whether a 
takings claim was ripe for review. See I.C. § 67-6521(d). 
As explained more fully in Petitioner's opening brief, the Board's conclusion that a 
takings would occur absent a variance was erroneous. See Petitioner's Brief at 26-31. In the 
zoning context, Idaho courts have said that requiring compliance with newly enacted 
ordinances constitutes a taking only where the "ordinance ... prohibits the continuation of 
all existing lawful [uses] within a zoned area." 0 'Connor, 69 Idaho at 41,202 P .2d at 403. 
However, no taking occurs where municipalities "firm[ly] regulat[ e] ... nonconforming uses 
with a view to their eventual elimination." Bastian, 104 Idaho at 309, 658 P.2d 980. In this 
case, the application of the County frontage requirement did not prohibit the continuation of 
the nonconforming residential use of Meyers parcels. BCBZO § 1-201. In fact, the 
ordinance would have allowed that use to exist indefinitely, provided the use was continuous 
and did not expand. BCBZO § 1-203. However, because the Meyers discontinued the use 
ofthe two old ranch houses and now want two new, larger residences at a different locations, 
it is not a taking to now require them to fully comply with all the requirements of the zoning 
ordinance. 
In sum, Respondent's argument that the taking issue "is not ripe" and was mere obiter 
dictum is nothing more than an effort to direct the Court's attention away from the Board's 
reliance upon an erroneous takings analysis to justify its issuance of a variance. Simply 
stated, there can be no taking of a right that did not exist. Respondent's reliance upon the 
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takings issue as justification for granting the variance is clearly erroneous as a matter oflaw. 
II. 
CONCLUSION 
The Board made numerous errors oflaw when evaluating the Meyers' application for 
a variance. This Court may freely review any and all questions of law determined by the 
Board and the Board's determination thereon are entitled to no deference whatsoever. The 
material facts in this case are undisputed-that is, there is no dispute that the Meyers 
voluntarily discontinued use of the two dilapidated ranch houses for a period of at least seven 
(7) years. The County's non-conforming use ordinance clearly and unambiguously provides 
that discontinuation of a non-conforming use causes its lapse. Meyers' need for the variance 
was self-created by virtue of their decision to discontinue use of the existing ranch houses 
and to opt for two newer, larger residential structures. Meyers simply want a privilege 
possessed by no other resident of the County, to wit: the right to construct two new 
residences devoid of any obligation to comply with the County frontage requirement. 
Neither the circumstances nor the law justify excusing them from that duty. 
This case presents the somewhat unusual circumstance where the Board's decision 
should be reversed and the variance request should be denied as a matter oflaw, without any 
need to remand the matter to the Board for further factual determination. The Meyers' 
discontinuance of the use for a period of more than one (1) year is undisputed, the County's 
non-conforming use provisions unambiguously provide for a lapse after non-use for a period 
in excess of one (1) year and the Meyers do not qualify for a variance as a matter oflaw, 
based upon the undisputed fact that they caused the need for the variance and are asking for 
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a privilege possessed by no other citizen of the County. There is no need to remand for 
further factual evaluation. 
F or the reasons set forth above, the Court should reverse the Board's decision and rule 
that the variance should be denied as a matter of law. 
r--d. 
DA TED this J day of November, 2008. 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.c. 
Dale W. Storer 
Daniel C. Dansie 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
INRE: 
Application for a Variance to Validate the 
Right to Replace a Single Family 
Dwelling on Parcels Without the Required 
100' of Road Frontage. 
STAN HAWKINS, 
Petitioner, 
-vs.-
BONNEVILLE COUNTY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS, acting as a Board of 
Adjustment. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Respondent, ) 
) 
-vs.- ) 
) 
DALE AND MARLA MEYER, husband ) 
and wife, ) 
) 
Applicants. ) 
Case No. CV-2007-6123 
MINUTE ENTRY 
December 1,2008, a Petition for Judicial Review of Agency's Final Order came on for 
hearing before the Honorable Jon J. Shindurling, District Judge, sitting in open cOUli at Idaho 
Falls, Idaho. 
:\IINllTE ENTRY I 
Mrs. Nancy Marlow, Court Reporter, and Ms. Rhonda Quintana, Deputy Court Clerk, 
were present. 
Mr. Dale Storer appeared on behalf of petitioner. 
Mr. Blake Hall appeared on behalf of respondents. 
Mr. Kipp Manwaring appeared on behalf of applicants. 
Mr. Storer addressed the Court in support of the petition. 
Mr. Hall responded in opposition and offered argument thereof. 
Mr. Storer continued with argument in support. 
The Court inquired of counsel and took this matter under advisement and would issue its 
opinion and order in due course. 
Court was thus adjourned. 
c: Dale Storer 
Blake Hall 
Kipp Manwaring 
120108AMShinduri #5 
MINUTE ENTRY - 2 
I 
JON. 
1[,4 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
STAN HAWKINS, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
BONNEVILLE COUNTY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS, acting as a Board of 
Adjustment, 
Respondent, 
v. DALE AND MARLA MEYER, 
husband and wife, 
Applicants. 
I. 
Case No. CV-2007-6123 
OPINION, DECISION, AND ORDER 
ON PETITIONERS' PETITION FOR 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Dale and Marla Meyer own several parcels of land off Bone Road in Idaho Falls. On 
February 28,2007, the Meyers went before the Bonneville County Planning and Zoning 
Commission to request a variance to construct new homes on two of their parcels of land. The 
parcels both currently have existing homes, which the Meyers seek to replace with new 
construction. 
One of the homes-referred to as the Rockwood house-was built in 1936. The 
Rockwood house was last permanently occupied in 2001, when the Meyers purchased the home 
from the daughter of the original owner. Since 2001 the Meyers have maintained the home but it 
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appears from testimony before the zoning commission that is has not been a year-round 
residence since the Meyers acquired the home. The Rockwood home does not have direct 
frontage on Bone Road and the Meyers rely on an easement traversing Stan Hawkins' property-
also referred to as Spur Road--to reach the home from Bone Road. 
The Rockwood house lies in the Canyon Creek flood plain and the Meyers want to tear it 
down and build a new home on the property, out of the flood plain. 
The other parcel has a house refen·ed to as the 1 efson house that was built in 1910. The 
Meyers have spent time and money modernizing the house, but have moved the home off of its 
original stone foundation because a spring has developed on the side of the house. It appears 
from the record that the lefson house has been unoccupied since 1999. The Meyers have 
determined that further repairing the existing house is not cost-effective and they hope to build a 
new house on that parcel, as well. 
The lefson house sits behind the Bone Store, but at the time Mr. Meyer's father 
purchased the house in 1954 the house apparently had frontage on Bone Road. The county 
moved Bone Road in 1958, denying the lefson house of its frontage. Since 1958 the lefson house 
has also relied on the easement for access to Bone Road. 
The Meyers requested a variance from the requirement that homes have at least 100 feet 
of frontage on an established county road. The BOlmeville County Board of Adjustments voted 
five to one to determine that a variance was not required because of the parcels' nonconforming 
historical use. Mr. Hawkins appealed the permit and on September 6, 2007 the BOlmeville 
County Commissioners adopted the board's decision. The County Commissioners also 
determined that the Meyers never intended to abandon the land, and that the access road was a 
county road. 
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Mr. Hawkins filed a Petition for Judicial Review of the County Commissioners' decision 
and, following voluminous briefing, this matter was called up for hearing on December 1,2008. 
After considering the Court's file, pleadings, depositions, admissions, affidavits, and the 
argument of counsel, the Court renders the following opinion. 
II. 
ST ANDARD OF REVIEW 
"The Idaho Administrative Procedures Act [(LA.P.A.)] governs the review of local 
zoning decisions." Price v. Payette County Bd. of County Com 'rs, 131 Idaho 426, 429, 958 P.2d 
583,586 (1998) (citing Comer v. County of Twin Falls, 130 Idaho 433, 437, 942 P.2d 557, 561 
(1997)). In an appeal from the decision of a district court acting in its appellate capacity under 
the LA.P.A., this Court reviews the agency record independently of the district court's decision. 
Id. (citations omitted); Howard v. Canyon County Bd. ofComm'rs, 128 Idaho 479, 480, 915 P.2d 
709, 710 (1996) (citation omitted). Interpretation of an ordinance, like construction of a statute, 
is an issue of law and therefore an appellate court exercises free review of the district court's 
decision. See State v. Nelson, 119 Idaho 444, 446,807 P.2d 1282,1284 (CLApp.l991). 
This Court, however, does not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the 
weight of the evidence presented. LC. § 67- 5279(1). Rather, this COUli defers to the agency's 
findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Price, 131 Idaho at 429, 958 P.2d at 586 
(citing Castaneda v. Brighton Corp., 130 Idaho 923, 926, 950 P.2d 1262, 1265 (1998)) (citing 
South Fork Coalition v. Board ofComm'rs of Bonneville County, 117 Idaho 857, 860, 792 P.2d 
882, 885 (1990)). "In other words, the agency's factual determinations are binding on the 
reviewing court, even where there is conflicting evidence before the agency, so long as the 
determinations are supported by substantial competent evidence in the record." Id. 
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[6] [7] The Board's zoning decision may only be overturned where its findings: (a) violate 
statutory or constitutional provisions; (b) exceed the agency's statutory authority; (c) are made 
upon unlawful procedure; (d) are not supported by substantial evidence in the record; or (e) are 
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.ld. (citing I.C. § 67-5279(3». The paIiy attacking 
the Board's decision must first show that the Board erred in a manner specified in Idaho Code § 
67-5279(3), and then it must show that its substantial right has been prejudiced.ld. (citing 
Angstman v. City of Boise, 128 Idaho 575, 578, 917 P.2d 409, 412 (Ct.App.1996». 
III. 
ANALYSIS 
A. No Substantial Rights Have Been Prejudiced 
As a threshold issue, Respondents challenge Petitioner's ability to challenge the Board of 
Commissioners' decision. "The party challenging the zoning board's decision must first show the 
zoning board's error under I.e. § 67-5279(3), aI1d secondly, that such error has prejudiced a 
substantial right of the party." Lane Ranch Partnership v. City of Sun Valley, 145 Idaho 87, 89 
(Idaho 2007) (citing Price v. Payette County Bd. of County Com 'rs, 131 Idaho 426, 429 (1998». 
Petitioner seeks judicial review under I.C. § 67-6521(d), which provides that "[a]n affected 
person aggrieved by a [LLUP] decision may within twenty-eight (28) days after all remedies 
have been exhausted under local ordinances seek judicial review as provided by chapter 52, title 
67, Idaho Code." 
Here, Petitioner maintains that he may challenge the variance because the variance will 
lead to increased traffic on the access road across his property. Petitioner argues that traffic on 
the road is currently limited to infrequent agricultural use. Increased traffic, Petitioner argues, 
will also increase the possibility that his livestock will wander out of what is sure to be a more 
frequently opened gate. Petitioner does not challenge the validity of the farm access easement. 
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The court notes that although there were dicta in the County Commissioners' decision 
referring to the Spur Road as an existing county road,the court does not take a position on that 
classification and considers this appeal assuming the access road was an easement on Petitioner's 
property. 
Petitioner relies in part on the Idaho Supreme Court decision in Evans v. Teton County, 
139 Idaho 71 (Idaho 2003). In Evans, the county commission approved a zoning change for a 
developer seeking to subdivide a large agricultural plot into 500 residential lots, a resort hotel, an 
l8-hole golf course, a helicopter pad, and many other commercial developments. 
The court held that the petitioner landowner could challenge the county commissioners' 
decision under I.e. § 67-6521. I.C. § 67-6521 (l)(a) defines an affected person as "one having an 
interest in real property which may be adversely affected by the issuance or denial of a permit 
authorizing the development." The court, reciting the long list of proposed developments, found 
that "[c]learly, the appellants' properties may be adversely affected by" the development. Evans, 
139 Idaho at 75. The court also held that" [t ]he existence of real or potential hann is sufficient to 
challenge a land use decision." Id.at 76. 
Similarly, the Idaho Supreme Court held adjoining landowners to have standing where a 
neighbor sought to subdivide and develop 160 acres in HD Dunn & Son LP v. Teton County, 140 
Idaho 808, 810 (Idaho 2004), though the court did not analyze the case in light of I.e. § 67-5279. 
Respondents argue that the affect on Petitioner's rights in this case differs from HD Dunn 
and Evans because here the use of the neighboring land does not change, and that the status quo 
in place for decades is unchanged. Here, there is no subdivision of the land or development. The 
only changes to the land adjoining Petitioner's would be the construction of new homes 
replacing the homes that currently rest there. Additionally, Respondent argues that under § 67-
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5279(4), Petitioner has not shown that the "substantial rights of the appellant have been 
prejudiced" by the board's decision. 
The facts of this case differ significantly from those of HD Dunn and Evans. In both of 
those cases the petitioner's neighbor sought to fundamentally change the nature of the land use. 
Both cases involved a minimum of 30 new non-agricultural lots and developments surrounding 
the petitioner's agricultural home. The petitioners in the Evans case were protesting a major 
mixed use development that completely changed the face of the property surrounding their home 
and expected to bring in thousands of people to live and work. 
This case involves replacing two dilapidated single family homes with two new 
construction single family homes. The lots will not be subdivided and they will retain their 
zoning and use as agricultural properties. In Evans the zoning change lead to a dramatic change 
in the traditional agricultural use and quality of the land. Here, Petitioner's only complaint is of 
harm from traffic that apparently ran regularly from the mid-20th century until 2001, several 
years after Petitioner moved onto the property. 
Most significantly, the variance does not affect the Petitioner's rights to his property nor 
the Meyers' right to access their property. Had the board denied the Meyers' request in this case 
the Meyers would have no less right to access their property by traversing Petitioner's property 
than they had when Petitioner purchased the property in 1998. Petitioner offers no support for the 
notion that the exercise of a pre-existing right can act to prejUdice a substantial right. In reaching 
this decision, the court does not take a position on the dicta of the County Commissioners' 
decision referring to the Spur Road as an existing county road. 
Petitioner argues that he has a concrete and tangible interest in the increased frequency of 
traffic going to the Meyers' property. Undoubtedly there will be more traffic on the access road 
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if the Meyers build new homes on the property. However, that change does not represent a 
material change in the burden on the easement and the change in traffic does not represent a 
prejudiced substantial right. Under I.C. § 67-5279, Petitioner does not have the ability to petition 
for judicial review. 
B. County Commissioners Decision 
In reaching this decision, the court does not take a position on the dicta of the County 
Commissioners' decision referring to the Spur Road as an existing county road. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
The Petition for Judicial Review of the Board's and Commission's decisions is 
DISMISSED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this ~ day of February, 2009. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
INRE: 
Application for a Variance to Validate the 
Right to Replace a Single Family 
Dwelling on Parcels Without the Required 
100' of Road Frontage. 
STAN HAWKINS, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
BONNEVILLE COUNTY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS, acting as a Board of 
Adjustment. 
Respondent, 
v. 
DALE AND MARLA MEYER, husband 
and wife, 
Applicants. 
Case No. CV-07-6123 
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
ORIGINAL 
COMES NOW, the Petitioner, Stan Hawkins, moves the Court for an Order 
reconsidering its Memorandum Decision dated February 2, 2009. 
This Motion is made for the reason that said Decision fails to consider the effect the 
Respondent's decision has for increasing the potential for fire hazard and property loss 
arising from the Respondent's failure to enforce their frontage requirement and their issuance 
of a variance with respect thereto. Specifically, the purpose of such frontage requirement is 
to facilitate ready access of public safety and fire equipment and personnel to the residential 
structures. The Commissioners' decision substantially increases the risk of uncontrolled fire 
originating within or upon the Applicants' two residential structures and the spread of such 
nre to the adjoining old growth quaking aspen groves, sage brush and the grain fields and 
structures upon Petitioner's property. 
By virtue of such potential risk for harm to person or property, Petitioner is an 
affected person under Idaho Code § 67-6521 and as such has standing to challenge the 
Commissioners' decision in this matter. 
Oral argument is requested. 
~ 
DATED this .5 day of February, 2009. 
Dale W. Storer 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. 
2 PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State ofIdaho, resident of and 
with my office in Idaho Falls, that I served a true and correct copy of the following described 
pleading or document on the attorney listed below by hand delivering, mailing or by 
~ 
facsimile, as indicated below, with the correct postage thereon, on this 6" day ofF ebruary, 
2009. 
DOCUMENT SERVED: 
ATTORNEY SERVED: 
Blake G. Hall 
Anderson Nelson Hall Smith, P.A. 
P.O. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1630 
Kipp L. Manwaring 
381 Shoup Avenue, Suite 210 
P.O. Box 50271 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0271 
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
(v) Mail 
( ) Hand Delivery 
( ) Facsimile 
( \./) Mail 
( ) Hand Delivery 
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Dale W. Storer 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.c. 
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BLAKE G. HALL 
Idaho State Bar No. 2434 
NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER, P.A. 
490 Memorial Drive 
P. O. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls. Idaho 83405-1630 
Telephone (208) 522-3001 
Fax (208) 523-7354 
ISB No. 2434 
Attorney for Respondent Bonneville County Board Of Commissioners 
IN TIlE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
IN RE: 
App lication for a Variance to Validate the 
Right to Replace a Single Family Dwelling 
on Parcels Without the Required 100, 
STAN HAWKINS 
Petitioner, 
v. 
BONNEVILLE COUNTY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS, acting as a Board of 
Adjustment, 
Respondent, 
v. 
DALE and MARLA MEYER, husband and 
\vife, GREEN VALLEY RANCH, INC., 
Applicants. 
Case No. CV-07-6123 
RESPONDENT'S OBJECTION TO 
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERA TION 
RESPONDENT'S OBJECTION TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION- 1 
COMES NOW. the Respondent, Bonneville County Board of Commissioners, and 
hereby submits this memorandum in objection to petitioner's motion for reconsideration. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Hawkins' Motion for Reconsideration should be dismissed because Hawkins 
is not allowed to file a motion for reconsideration of a District Court's Order 
made in its appellate capacity in review of an agency decision. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (a)(2)(B) provides that "a motion for 
recons idcrat ion 0 r any order 0 f the trial court made after entry of final judgment may be 
filed within fourteen (14) days after the entry of such order .... " The final judgment in this 
matter came in the form of the Board of Commissioners' decision. That judgment was then 
appealed to the District Court. Any motion for reconsideration should have been filed after 
the decision of the Board of Commissioners. This matter came before the District COUli in 
its appellate capacity, as an appeal of an agency decision. This cOUli was not the trial court, 
and therefore, I.R. C.P. 11 (a )(2)(B) does not apply. The proper procedure for petitioner is to 
file an appeal with the Supreme COUli instead of filing this motion for reconsideration. As 
a result, this Court should dismiss the motion for reconsideration. 
B. Hawkins' motion for reconsideration should be denied because it is based 
upon cvidence and argument that was not part of the agcncy record on 
appeal. 
Courts have refused to consider claims which are raised for the first time on appeal. 
"A litigant may not remain silent as to claimed error during a trial and later urge his 
objections thereto for the first time on appeal." Barmore v. Perrone, 145 Idaho 340, 343, 179 
P.3d 303,306 (2008); citing Hoppe v. McDonald, 103 Idaho 33, 35, 644 P.2d 355, 357 
(l982). In addition, "[s]ubstantive issues will not be considered the first time on appeal." 
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('rOlI'ley \', ('rifchjiehl, 2007 WL 4245905 at 3 (Idaho, Dec. 5,2007). "The longstanding rule 
of this Court is that we will not consider issues that are raised for the first time on appeal." 
Id. 
In his motion for reconsideration, Hawkins claims that he has standing in this matter 
because "the Commissioners' decision substantially increases the risk of uncontrolled fire 
originating within or upon the Applicants' two residential structures and the spread of such 
fire to the adjoining old growth quaking aspen groves, sage brush and the grain fields and 
structures upon Petitioner's property." See, Motion/or Reconsideration, p. 2. Hawkins 
claims that "by virtue of such risk" he is an affected person under Idaho Code § 67-6521. 
However, this argument should not be considered by the Court because it was not raised in 
the administrative proceeding before the Board of Commissioners. Hawkins has not cited to 
a single fact in the agency record to show that this argument was presented to the Board of 
Commissioners. In addition, a review of the briefs submitted on appeal reveals that this 
argument was never even raised at the appellate stage of proceedings. There is no precedent 
for considering new claims presented for the first time on a motion for reconsideration. 
Therefore, the Court should deny Hawkins' motion for reconsideration. 
C. Hawkins' motion for reconsideration should be denied because there is no 
evidence in the record to support his unsubstantiated allegation that the 
commissioners' decision "substantially increases"the risk of fire on his 
property. 
Hawkins asserts a single bare legal conclusion in support of his motion for 
reconsideration - that "the Commissioners' decision substantially increases the risk of 
ullcontrolled fire originating within or upon the Applicants' two residential structures .... " 
Scc, l'v1olionjhr Reconsideration, p. 2. There is no citation to any fact in the agency record to 
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support this allegation in Hawkins' motion for reconsideration. The burden is on the 
moving party to bring the trial court's attention to facts in the record which support an 
allegation in a motion to reconsider, and the court is under no obligation to search the record 
to determine if there are any facts to support the allegation. See, Coeur d'Alene A1ining Co. v. 
First Nat 'I Bank, 118 Idaho 812, 800 P .2d 1026 (1990). Due to the fact that Hawkins has 
failed to cite to any evidence in the record to support the argument that there is a "substantial 
increase" of risk of fire to Hawkins' property, this motion for reconsideration should be 
denied. As it stands, there is no evidence before the court to support a finding that Hawkins 
has standing to pursue the claims in this matter. 
D. Hawkins has not demonstrated that the variance will prejudice "substantial 
rights" in his property. 
In order to prevail on this motion for reconsideration, Hawkins must demonstrate 
that he has standing. Idaho Code § 67-5279(4) states: "Notwithstanding the provisions of 
subsections (2) and (3) of this section, agency action shall be affirmed unless substantial 
rights of the appellant have been prejudiced." The Idaho Supreme Court has found that such 
"substantial rights" include a person's ability to access their property and develop their 
property for permissible uses. Lane Ranch Partnership v. City a/Sun Valley, 145 Idaho 87, 
_, 175 P.3d 776, 780 (2007). Hawkins argues in this motion that he has standing because 
there has allegedly been a "substantial increase" in risk of fire originating on the Applicants' 
two structures and spreading to Hawkins' property. He claims that this risk has arisen "from 
the Respondent's failure to enforce their frontage requirement and their issuance of a 
variance with respect thereto. Specifically, the purpose of such frontage requirement is to 
facilitate ready access of public safety and fire equipment and personnel to the residential 
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structures. ,. 
Hawkins' argument assumes an incorrect and unsubstantiated interpretation of the 
Bonneville County Zoning Ordinance. Hawkins implies that the only 'purpose' behind the 
frontage requirement is to provide access for the fire department or other emergency 
personnel. The Ordinance on the frontage requirement does not expressly refer to 'fire 
department access,' and in reality the general policy behind the frontage requirement is 
much more broad. Further, for purposes of this matter, it is not this Court's responsibility to 
make an ad hoc interpretation of the policy behind the frontage requirement in the 
Ordinance. If Hawkins wanted to contest the policy behind the frontage requirement with 
regard to fire department access he should have submitted the issue to the Board of 
Commissioners in the first instance. 
There is simply no evidence to support the contention that the issuance of the 
\ariance has prejudiced Hawkins' substantial rights in his property. There has always been 
a risk of fire to the Applicants' property because of the existing dilapidated structures. 
There has always been a lack of frontage on the Applicants' prope11y. There is no evidence 
that issuance of the variance changed the "risk of fire," there is only the conclusory opinion 
of Hawkins. If the court were to rely on conclusory hypotheticals, the court would have to 
consider the possibility that the Applicants could construct agricultural structures on the 
property without a variance such as a shop where welding and equipment fabrication would 
occur, or a grain elevator, or hay shed - all of which uses are clearly within the normal 
purposes of an agricultural zone. In any of those scenarios the increased risk of fire 
originating on the Applicants' property and spreading to Hawkins' property would be much 
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greater than if the Applicants were to re-build the two residences. Hawkins' unsupported 
conclusions do not demonstrate that he will be substantially affected in his ability to "access 
his prope11y" or "develop his property for permissible uses." Therefore, this court should 
deny this motion for reconsideration. 
In conclusion, the Court properly considered the evidence and applied the correct 
legal standard on appeal in this matter. There is no reason to reconsider the Court's 
decision. This motion for reconsideration filed by Hawkins should be denied based upon the 
foregoing procedural and substantive shortcomings. 
DATED this~day of February, 2009. 
~.ff(iL 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
INRE: 
Application for a Variance to Validate the 
Right to Replace a Single Family 
Dwelling on Parcels Without the Required 
100' of Road Frontage. 
STAN HAWKINS, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
BONNEVILLE COUNTY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS, acting as a Board of 
Adjustment. 
Respondent, 
v. 
DALE AND MARLA MEYER, husband 
and wife, 
Applicants. 
Case No. CV-07-6123 
PETITIONER'S RESPONSE TO 
RESPONDENT'S OBJECTION TO 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
ORIGINAL 
COMES NOW Petitioner, Stan Hawkins, and hereby responds to Bonneville County's 
Objection to Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, filed on February 27,2009. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Petitioner's Motion for Consideration Is Based on I.R.C.P. 84(r) and I.A.R. 42, 
Rather than I.R.C.P. 11(a)(2)(B). 
Respondent argues that Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration will not lie because 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure only allow for reconsideration of an order of a trial cOUli. 
Respondent misapprehends the basis for Petitioner's Motion. LR.C.P. 84(1') provides that, 
"Any procedure for judicial review not specified or covered by these rules shall be in 
accordance with the appropriate Rule of the Idaho Appellate Rules ... " LA.R. 42 does 
provide for a petition for rehearing or reconsideration. Petitioner's Motion for 
Reconsideration is brought under that Rule, rather than I.R.C.P. 1 1 (a)(2)(B). Accordingly, 
Respondent's argument has no merit. 
B. Respondent, Rather than Petitioner, Raised the Standing Issue for the First Time 
on Appeal. 
Respondent argues that Petitioner's Motion should be denied because it contains 
arguments that are raised for the firsttime on Appeal. Respondent's Objection to Petitioner's 
Motion for Reconsideration, p. 2. In this regard two points should be made. First, it was 
Respondent, not Petitioner, who raised the standing argument for the first time on appeal. 
Specifically, the Bonneville County Commissioners did not premise their decision upon 
Hawkins' alleged lack of standing, nor did they object to Petitioner's alleged lack of standing 
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at the outset of the hearing or at any time thereafter. The issue was raised for the first time 
on appeal by the Respondent, not Petitioner. 
Admittedly, Petitioner did not point to the fire hazard issue in its initial response to 
the Respondent's Reply Brief. Rather Petitioner pointed to other factors demonstrating that 
he was "affected by the issuance or denial" of the subject permit. As Respondent correctly 
points out, a petition for judicial review is in the nature of an appellate proceeding, not a trial 
proceeding. However, Respondent has pointed to no Rule of Appellate procedure providing 
that a failure to raise an issue in a reply brief constitutes a waiver. To the contrary, as noted 
above, the Idaho Rules of Appellate Procedure specifically provide for the filing of petitions 
for rehearing, wherein reconsideration of the Court's decision is expressly allowed. 
In sum, it was the Respondent who raised the standing issue for the first time on 
Appeal and Respondent has pointed to no Rule that would preclude the Court from 
reconsidering its decision herein. 
C. Ample Evidence Is in the Record to Support Petitioner's Standing in the Case. 
The County asserts that Hawkins' Motion for Reconsideration should be denied 
because there is no evidence in the record to support his allegation that the Commissioners' 
grant ofthe variance increased the risk of fire hazard to Hawkin's property. See Respondent 
Objection to Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, p. 3. Again, Respondent 
misapprehends the focus of Hawkins' standing argument and further misconstrues the 
minimal level of proof required under Idaho Code § 67-6521. As noted earlier in Petitioner's 
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Brief, Idaho Code § 67-6521 provides a right of an appeal to an "affected person." An 
"affected person" is defined as "one having an interest in real property which may be 
adversely affected by the issuance or denial of a permit authorizing the development ... " 
(emphasis added). Clearly, there is no requirement for proof that the affected person 
actually is or was affected by the issuance or denial of the permit. Rather, the statute is 
forward-looking, (i.e. "may be affected ... "), for obvious reasons, to wit: Until the 
permittee has actually started construction there is no way to determine whether or not the 
affected person has been damaged. Consequently, in order to prove standing the Petitioner 
is merely required to demonstrate a potential for being affected. There is no requirement 
whatsoever to prove the risk has in fact materialized. 
Aside from the lack of any obligation to prove the risk has actually materialized, (i.e. 
that the Commissioners' decision has in fact produced a fire hazard), Respondent also 
misapprehends the nature ofthe proof required to demonstrate standing. As noted above, the 
issue is not whether the Commissioners' decision will in fact cause a fire hazard. Rather the 
standing issue, merely involves an inquiry as to whether or not Hawkins falls within the class 
of persons for whose benefit the frontage requirement was adopted. The determination of 
the class of citizens for whose benefit the ordinance was adopted, is clearly a question oflaw 
for which no proof whatsoever is required. As admitted by the Respondent at oral argument, 
the purpose of the frontage requirement set forth in BCZBO § 1-707 is to facilitate 
emergency access for police, fire and other public safety vehicles and personnel. That being 
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the admitted purpose ofthe Ordinance, the question then becomes whether or not Hawkins 
falls within the class of persons for whose benefit this Ordinance was adopted. It takes no 
great stretch of imagination to conclude that the Ordinance was intended to protect 
residential property owners, as well as adjoining land owners whose propeliy might also be 
damaged by uncontrolled spread of fire. The record is replete with proof that Hawkins was 
an adjoining property owner and from that fact alone, the Court can find standing to contest 
the Commissioners' refusal to enforce the Ordinance. 
In sum, there is no requirement whatsoever that Hawkins prove "that there is a 
substantial increase of risk" to his property. 
D. Hawkins' Substantial Property Rights Are Potentially Jeopardized by the 
County's Refusal to Enforce its Own Ordinance. 
The County in effect argues that the risk of fire hazard was unchanged by their 
decision and that Hawkins therefore has not met his burden of demonstrating that his 
"substantial rights" have been prejudiced. See Idaho code § 67 -5279( 4). In making that 
argument, the County confuses the difference between finding that "substantial rights" have 
been prejudiced and the impossible burden of demonstrating some difference in the quantum 
of fire risk in the "before" and "after" status of the Petitioner's property. As noted above, 
"affected person" status does not require a showing of actual harm, in advance of the 
implementation of the permit. Idaho Code § 67-6521 only requires the Petitioner to 
demonstrate that his property "may be adversely affected." Thus in this case, there is no 
requirement whatsoever that Hawkins demonstrate the actual occurrence of a "substantial 
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increase" in the risk of tire originating from the applicant's structures. The question more 
properly framed, is whether Hawkins' property may be affected by the issuance of the permit 
(i.e. Hawkins was within the class of property owners whose property was the object ofthe 
ordinance) and whether such property rights are substantial. The County cannot here argue 
in good faith that Hawkins' property rights are insubstantial. As the record reflects, Hawkins 
owns grain fields, grazing land, fences and old growth forest land adjacent to the Meyers' 
property, all of which are potentially jeopardized by an adjoining fire hazard. As an 
adjoining property owner, Hawkins falls within the class of citizens whose "substantial 
property rights" were protected by the Ordinance. The potential fire hazard created by the 
Commissioners' refusal to enforce their own ordinance has prejudiced Hawkins' substantial 
property rights. 
CONCLUSION 
The degree of proof necessary to meet the threshold standing requirement is minimal 
at best. In this case, Hawkins need only to show that he was in the class of persons for whose 
benefit the Ordinance was adopted. The County has admitted the Ordinance was adopted to 
facilitate and ensure access by tire protection and public safety personnel to residential 
properties. It cannot be argued in good faith that this purpose is limited solely to protecting 
the property owner upon whose property the fire originates. Hawkins, being an adjoining 
land owner, is clearly within the class of persons for whose benefit BCZBO § 1-707 was 
adopted and the County's refusal to enforce the frontage requirement most clearly affects his 
substantial property rights. 
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DATED this 1 day of March, 2009. 
Dale W. Storer 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. 
7 - PETITIONER'S RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT'S OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR 
RECONSlDERA TION 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State ofIdaho, resident of and 
with my office in Idaho Falls, that I served a true and correct copy of the following described 
pleading or document on the attorney listed below by hand delivering, mailing or by 
facsimile, as indicated below, with the conect postage thereon, on this 1flt day of March, 
2009. 
DOCUMENT SERVED: 
ATTORNEY SERVED: 
Blake G. Hall 
Anderson Nelson Hall Smith, P.A. 
P.O. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1630 
Kipp L. Manwaring 
381 Shoup Avenue, Suite 210 
P.O. Box 50271 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0271 
PETITIONER'S RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT'S 
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( ) Hand Delivery 
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( ) Hand Delivery 
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Dale W. Storer 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
STAN HAWKINS, ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Plaintiff, 
-vs.-
BONNEVILLE COUNTY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2007-6123 
MINUTE ENTRY ON 
MOTION HEARING 
On March 9, 2009, at 10:30 AM, a Motion to Reconsider and a Motion for Attorney Fees 
came on for hearing before the Honorable Jon J. Shindurling, District Judge, sitting in open C0U11 
at Idaho Falls, Idaho. 
Ms. Nancy Marlow, Court Reporter, and Ms. Grace Walters, Deputy Court Clerk, were 
present. 
Mr. Dale Storer and Mr. Dan Dansie appeared on behalf of plaintiff. Mr. Blake Hall 
appeared with the defendant. 
Mr. Storer presented argument on the Motion to Reconsider. 
Mr. Hall argued in rebuttal to the Motion to Reconsider. 
Mr. Storer addressed the rebuttal argument. 
Mr. Hall addressed the COUli on the matter of attorney fees. 
After a brief discussion with the parties, the Court will issue a ruling on the matter after 
reviewing the briefs. 
MINUTE ENTRY - 1 
Court was thus adjourned. 
c: Dale Storer 
Blake Hall 
MINUTE ENTRY - 2 
HINDURLING 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
STAN HAWKINS, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
BONNEVILLE COUNTY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS, acting as a Board of 
Adjustment, 
Respondent, 
v. DALE AND MARLA MEYER, 
husband and wife, 
Applicants. 
Case No. CV-2007-6123 
OPINION, DECISION, AND ORDER 
ON PETITIONERS' MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERA TION 
This matter initially came before the court as a petition for judicial review of a decision 
by the Bonneville County Commissioners granting Dale and Marla Meyer a variance to demolish 
and replace two dilapidated houses with new, larger homes. This court entered a decision on 
February 2, 2009, dismissing the petition. Petitioner now asks the court to reconsider its earlier 
decision. 
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Dale and Marla Meyer own several parcels of land off Bone Road in Idaho Falls. On 
February 28, 2007, the Meyers went before the Bonneville County Planning and Zoning 
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Commission to request a variance to construct new homes on two of their parcels of land. The 
parcels both currently have existing homes, which the Meyers seek to replace with new 
construction. 
One of the homes-referred to as the Rockwood house-was built in 1936. The 
Rockwood house was last permanently occupied in 200 1, when the Meyers purchased the home 
from the daughter of the original owner. Since 200 1 the Meyers have maintained the home but it 
appears from testimony before the zoning commission that is has not been a year-round 
residence since the Meyers acquired the home. The Rockwood home does not have direct 
frontage on Bone Road and the Meyers rely on an easement traversing Stan Hawkins' property-
also referred to as Spur Road--to reach the home from Bone Road. 
The Rockwood house lies in the Canyon Creek flood plain and the Meyers want to tear it 
down and build a new home on the property, out of the flood plain. 
The other parcel has a house referred to as the Jefson house that was built in 1910. The 
Meyers have spent time and money modernizing the house, but have moved the home off of its 
original stone foundation because a spring has developed on the side of the house. It appears 
from the record that the Jefson house has been unoccupied since 1999. The Meyers have 
determined that further repairing the existing house is not cost-effective and they hope to build a 
new house on that parcel, as well. 
The Jefson house sits behind the Bone Store, but at the time Mr. Meyer's father 
purchased the house in 1954 the house apparently had frontage on Bone Road. The county 
moved Bone Road in 1958, denying the Jefson house of its frontage. Since 1958 the Jefson house 
has also relied on the easement for access to Bone Road. 
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The Meyers requested a variance from the requirement that homes have at least 100 feet 
of frontage on an established county road. The Bonneville County Board of Adjustments voted 
five to one to determine that a variance was not required because of the parcels' nonconforming 
historical use. Mr. Hawkins appealed the permit and on September 6, 2007 the Bonneville 
County Commissioners adopted the board's decision. The County Commissioners also 
determined that the Meyers never intended to abandon the land, and that the access road was a 
county road. 
Mr. Hawkins filed a Petition for Judicial Review of the County Commissioners' decision 
and that matter was called up for hearing on December 1, 2008. On February 2, 2009 the court 
issued a decision denying the petition because Petitioner did not meet the prejudiced substantial 
rights requirement of I.C. § 67-5279 necessary to petition for judicial review. 
Petitioner filed this motion to reconsider on February 5, 2009. Petitioner argues that the 
court's previous decision failed to consider the effect Respondent's decision to allow the 
construction has for increasing potential fire hazards on Petitioner's property. Following 
responsive briefing, the matter came up for hearing on March 9, 2009. At the hearing, Petitioner 
also argued that the court had erred in its original decision in determining that Petitioner failed to 
meet the standard to petition required by I.C. § 67-5279. 
At the time of the hearing the court had not yet received the parties' briefs, and the court 
took the matter under advisement pending receipt of all briefs. 
Having considered the motions, affidavits, exhibits, supp0l1ing legal memoranda and 
oral arguments, the Court enters the following decision. 
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II. 
ANALYSIS 
Petitioner argues that the court's previous decision ignores the increased chance of fire 
damage to Petitioner's property resulting from Respondent's decision, and that the court erred in 
determining that Petitioner could not petition the court under I.C. § 67-5279. Respondent argues 
that Petitioner's motion is inappropriate as this court considered the original petition as an 
appellate body. Respondent also argues that Petitioner's argument is improperly raised and does 
not support Petitioner's ability to petition this cOUli under I.C. § 67-5279. 
Motion is Properly Before this Court 
Respondent argues that Petitioner has improperly brought this motion under I.R.C.P. 
1 1 (a)(2)(B). Petitioner contends that the motion is properly before the court under I.A.R. 42. 
I.A.R. 42 allows a party to file a petition for rehearing and requires briefing and allows 
for oral argument. Respondent argues that Petitioner has failed to comply with I.A.R. 42, in part 
by initially refening to this motion as a motion to reconsider. 
However, the Idaho Court of Appeals has "held that a motion to the district cOUli for 
reconsideration of a decision rendered in its appellate capacity should be treated as a petition for 
rehearing, an appropriate method to provide consistency in the appellate process." Dieziger v. 
Pickering, 122 Idaho 718, 719 (Ct.App. 1992)(citing Ustickv. Ustick, 104 Idaho 215, 219-20 
(Ct.App. 1983)). In this situation, regardless of the procedural awkwardness occasionally arising 
where a district court acts in an appellate role, this court agrees with Petitioner that this matter is 
properly before the court as a petition to rehear. Following the Court of Appeals standard is 
appropriate and allows this court to flexibly work within the rules while acting as an appellate 
body. 
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A motion for rehearing "is a request for a rehash of that which has already been decided; 
only briefs, and oral argument, too, on occasion are allowed." Frank v. Bunker Hill Co., 117 
Idaho 790, 808 (1988). 
Fire Hazard and Substantial Rights 
Petitioner argues that this court's dismissal of his petition failed to consider the effect 
Respondent's decision to allow the construction has of increasing potential fire hazards on 
Petitioner's property. Petitioner also argues that the court erred in its interpretation of I.e. § 67-
5279(4)'s requirement that "agency action shall be affirmed unless substantial rights of the 
appellant have been prejudiced." Respondent argues that Petitioner improperly raises the fire 
hazard argument for the first time on appeal, and that Petitioner's concerns about fire hazards do 
not satisfy I.C. § 67-5279. 
Petitioner argues that Respondent, by allowing the Meyers to replace their houses, 
ignores BCZBO § 1-707 and creates a fire hazard on Petitioner's property. BCBZO § 1-707 
requires that new homes have at least 100 feet of frontage on an established county road. 
Petitioner also argues that this court ignored the increased risk of fire hazard on Petitioner's 
property in issuing the original decision. 
In issuing the original order, this court held that Petitioner's argument that the Meyers' 
building of new houses on their property would increase traffic did not satisfy the requirements 
ofl.C. § 67-5279 because it did not affect the Meyers' or Petitioner's existing rights to their land. 
In reaching this decision, this court noted that "Petitioner offers no support for the notion that the 
exercise of a pre-existing right can act to prejudice a substantial right." At oral argument in this 
matter, Petitioner argued that the court mistakenly relied on an analysis of the Meyers' rights in 
the property before the variance was granted. Petitioner urges the court to instead consider 
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whether changes in the use of the Meyers' land could possibly negatively affect Petitioner's 
property. 
Petitioner relies on I.C. § 67-6521 of the Local Land Use Planning Act, which allows 
affected parties to petition local land use agencies and to appeal their decisions pursuant to the 
Administrative Procedures Act. An affected party is one "having an interest in real property 
which may be adversely affected by the issuance or denial of a pennit authorizing the 
development." I.e. § 67-6521(1)(a) Petitioner contends that because his land abuts the Myers' 
property, he is an affected person and may appeal from Respondent's decision. However, the 
LL UP A merely allows an affected party to "seek judicial review as provided by chapter 52, title 
67, Idaho Code [the APA]," which includes I.C. § 67-5279. The provisions in § 67-6521 can in 
no way be interpreted as offering relief through judicial review outside of the limitations found 
in § 67-5279. The relief intended by the LLUPA is anticipated and delivered entirely within the 
APA. This court reaffirms its original decision that Petitioner's claims raised in his petition for 
judicial review are barred by I.e. § 67-5279 because they do not represent a prejudice to 
Petitioner's substantial rights. 
Respondent also argues that Petitioner's argument is not properly before the court, 
claiming that Petitioner did not raise the fire hazard issue before the County Commissioners. A 
review of the record of the Bonneville County Board of Adjustments' hearing and the appeal 
before the County Commissioners supports the argument that Petitioner appears to have raised 
the issue for the first time during the December 2008 hearing on Petitioner's motion for 
reconsideration. Regardless, Petitioner's argument also fails under I.C. § 67-5279. 
Petitioner argues that he has standing under the frontage requirement because he is in the 
class of persons for whose benefit the ordinance was adopted. Any standing conferred by the 
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ordinance could allow Petitioner to bring his concerns about the fire hazard before zoning 
meetings and hearings before the County Commissioners, a right he appears not to have 
exercised. However, this court is strictly limited in its review of agency actions by the APA, and 
must affirm any agency action that does not prejudice a party's substantial rights. BCBZO § 1-
707 does not grant Petitioner additional substantive rights, nor does it provide this court with the 
authority to evade the limitations ofI.C. § 67-5279. 
Respondent's decision allowing the Meyers to build new homes does not change the 
status quo. The Meyers currently have two dilapidated houses on the property that apparently do 
not comply with the frontage requirement. Allowing the Meyers to replace those houses with two 
new homes does not change in any form the rights of Petitioner to his property. As Petitioner 
does not have substantial rights prejudiced by Respondent's decision, this court carmot disturb 
Respondent's action as a state agency pursuant to the AP A. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioner's motion is DENIED. 
ITISSO~ED. 
Dated this , ay of June, 2009. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 1 day of June, 2009, I served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing OPINION, DECISION, AND ORDER ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
upon the parties listed below by mailing, with the correct postage thereon, or by causing the 
same to be delivered to their courthouse boxes. 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
Dale W. Storer 
Daniel C. Dansie 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo 
P.O. Box 50130 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Attorney for Respondent 
Blake G. Hall 
Anderson Nelson Hall Smith 
490 Memorial Drive 
P.O. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1630 
Attorney for Applicants 
Kipp L. Manwaring 
Just Law Office 
P.O. Box 50271 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0271 
by 
Ronald Longmore 
Clerk of the District Court 
Bonneville County, Idaho 
Deputy Clerk 
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Dale W. Storer (ISB No. 2166) 
dstorer@holdenlegal.com 
Daniel C. Dansie (ISB No. 7985) 
ddansie@holdenlegal.com 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
P. O. Box 50130 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Telephone: (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518 
Attorneys for Appellant, Stan Hawkins 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BONNEVILLE COUNTY, 
STATE OF IDAHO 
INRE: 
Application for a Variance to Validate the 
Right to Replace a Single Family 
Dwelling on Parcels Without the Required 
100' of Road Frontage. 
STAN HAWKINS, 
Petitioner - Appellant 
v. 
BONNEVILLE COUNTY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS, acting as a Board of 
Adjustment. 
Respondent-Respondent, 
v. 
DALE AND MARLA MEYER, husband 
and wife, 
Applicants. 
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NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, BONNEVILLE COUNTY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS AND THE PARTY'S ATTORNEY BLAKE G. HALL AND 
THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named Appellant, Stan Hawkins, appeals against the above 
named Respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Opinion, Decision, and Order on 
Petitioner's Petition for Judicial Review, dated February 2,2009, and the Opinion, 
Decision, and Order on Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration, dated June 1,2009, both 
of which were issued by the Hon. Jon J. Shindurling. 
2. Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and 
pursuant to Rule 11(a)(2). 
3. Appellant intends to assert the following issue on appeal: whether 
Appellant has standing to pursue a Petition for Judicial Review of Respondent's decision 
to grant Applicant's request for a variance to build homes on property adjacent to 
Appellant's property. 
4. No Order has been entered sealing any portion of the record. 
5. Appellant requests that a reporter's transcript of the March 9, 2009, hearing 
on the Motion for Reconsideration be included in the record. Appellant requests a hard 
copy of the transcript. 
6. The Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the 
clerk's record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, LA.R.: 
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a. The entire record and transcript of the proceedings before the 
Bonneville County Planning and Zoning Commission, as lodged 
with the District Court. 
b. The entire record and transcript of the proceedings before 
Respondent Bonneville County Board of Commissioners, as lodged 
with the District Court. 
c. All decisions and orders of the District Court. 
d. All briefs filed in the District Court by Appellant and Respondent 
including all electronic attachments thereto. 
7. Appellant requests that all documents, charts, maps, and photographs 
attached to the items listed above be copied and sent to the Supreme Court. 
8. I certify that: 
a. A copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the court 
reporter for the District Court of Bonneville County. 
b. That the clerk of the District Court has been paid the estimated fee 
for preparation of the reporters transcript. 
c. The estimated fee for the preparation of the clerk's record has been 
paid. 
d. The appellate filing fee has been paid. 
e. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served 
pursuant to Rule 20. 
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DATED this fD day of July, 2009. 
Dale W. Storer 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, PLLC 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served a copy of the following described pleading or 
document on the attorneys listed below by hand delivering, by mailing or by facsimile, 
14 
with the correct postage thereon, on this day of July, 2009. 
DOCUMENT SERVED: NOTICE OF APPEAL 
ATTORNEYS SERVED: 
Blake G. Hall 
Nelson Hall Perry Tucker P A 
P.O. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1630 
Kipp L. Manwaring 
381 Shoup Avenue, Suite 210 
P.O. Box 50271 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0271 
Court Reporter for Judge Shindurling 
Bonneville County Courthouse 
605 N. Capital Ave. 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
( ~ail 
( ) Hand Delivery 
( ) Facsimile 
( -1'Mail 
( ) Hand Delivery 
( ) Facsimile 
( ) Facsimile 
( .,.--"') Mail 
( ) Hand Delivery 
( ) Facsimile 
( ) Facsimile 
/~J I ;! y~ tiM 
Dale W. Storer 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, PLLC 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
STAN HAWKINS, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs.-
BONNEVILLE CO. BOARD of 
COMMISSIONERS, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-2007-6123 
MINUTE ENTRY 
On July 14,2009, at 11:00 AM, a Motion for Attorney Fees came on for hearing before 
the Honorable Jon J. Shindurling, District Judge, sitting in open court at Idaho Falls, Idaho. 
Ms. Nancy Marlow, Court Reporter, and Ms. Grace Walters, Deputy COUli Clerk, were 
present. 
Mr. Dan Dansie appeared on behalf of plaintiff. Mr. Blake Hall appeared on behalf of 
defendant. 
Mr. Blake Hall presented argument on the Motion for Attorney Fees, and have amended 
the motion for costs and fees, requesting the Court grant the amended motion. 
Mr. Dansie argued in opposition to the Motion for costs and fees. Mr. Dansie argued that 
the June 23 rd motion for costs and fees should be viewed as a new motion and denied as 
untimely. 
Mr. Hall rebutted the opposition argument. 
MINllTE ENTRY - 1 
After a brief discussion with the parties, the Court will review the motion and issue a 
decision at a later date. 
Court was thus adjourned. 
c: Dale Storer 
Blake Hall 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
STAN HAWKINS, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
BONNEVILLE COUNTY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS, acting as a Board of 
Adjustment, 
Respondent, 
v. DALE AND MARLA MEYER, 
husband and wife, 
Applicants. 
1. 
Case No. CV-2007-6123 
.... 
OPINION, DECISION, AND ORDE~~ 
ON RESPONDENT'S MOTI<UN FOliE 
ATTORNEY'S FEES -;::;: 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Dale and Marla Meyer own several parcels of land off Bone Road in Idaho Falls. On 
February 28, 2007, the Meyers went before the Bonneville County Planning and Zoning 
Commission to request a variance to construct new homes on two of their parcels of land. The 
parcels both currently have existing homes, which the Meyers seek to replace with new 
construction. 
One of the homes-referred to as the Rockwood house-was built in 1936. The 
Rockwood house was last permanently occupied in 2001, when the Meyers purchased the home 
from the daughter of the original owner. Since 2001 the Meyers have maintained the home but it 
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appears from testimony before the zonmg commISSIOn that is has not been a year-round 
residence since the Meyers acquired the home. The Rockwood home does not have direct 
frontage on Bone Road and the Meyers rely on an easement traversing Stan Hawkins' property-
also referred to as Spur Road--to reach the home from Bone Road. 
The Rockwood house lies in the Canyon Creek flood plain and the Meyers want to tear it 
down and build a new home on the property, out of the flood plain. 
The other parcel has a house referred to as the lefson house that was built in 1910. The 
Meyers have spent time and money modernizing the house, but have moved the home off of its 
original stone foundation because a spring has developed on the side of the house. It appears 
from the record that the lefson house has been unoccupied since 1999. The Meyers have 
determined that further repairing the existing house is not cost-effective and they hope to build a 
new house on that parcel, as well. 
The lefson house sits behind the Bone Store, but at the time Mr. Meyer's father 
purchased the house in 1954 the house apparently had frontage on Bone Road. The county 
moved Bone Road in 1958, denying the lefson house of its frontage. Since 1958 the lefson house 
has also relied on the easement for access to Bone Road. 
The Meyers requested a variance from the requirement that homes have at least 100 feet 
of frontage on an established county road. The Bonneville County Board of Adjustments voted 
five to one to determine that a variance was not required because of the parcels' nonconforming 
historical use. Mr. Hawkins appealed the permit and on September 6, 2007 the Bonneville 
County Commissioners adopted the board's decision. The County Commissioners also 
determined that the Meyers never intended to abandon the land, and that the access road was a 
county road. 
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Mr. Hawkins filed a Petition for Judicial Review of the County Commissioners' decision 
and that matter was called up for hearing on December 1, 2008. 
In a February 2,2009 order, this court determined that Mr. Hawkins could not petition for 
judicial review of the decision as his substantial rights were not prejudiced as required by I.C. § 
67-5279(4). On February 5, 2009, Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, and the court 
heard argument on the motion. The court denied Petitioner's motion in a June 1, 2009 order. 
On February 10, 2009, Respondent filed a motion for attorney's fees. On July 14,2009, 
the attorney's fees issue came up for hearing and the court took the matter under advisement. 
After considering the Court's file, pleadings, depositions, admissions, affidavits, and the 
argument of counsel, the Court renders the following opinion. 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I.e. § 12-117(1) provides, in patt: 
[I]n any administrative or civil judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a 
state agency, a city, a county or other taxing district and a person, the court shall 
award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and reasonable 
expenses, if the court finds that the party against whom the judgment is rendered 
acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
An award of attorney fees generally rests in the discretion of the court. Anderson v. 
Ethington, 103 Idaho 658 (1982). However, I.e. § 12-117(1) is not discretionary; this court is 
bound by the statute to award attorney's fees and costs when the losing party acted without a 
reasonable basis in fact or law. Fischer v. City of Ketchum, 141 Idaho 349 (2005). 
In determining whether to award attorney's fees, this court must first determine whether 
the moving party prevailed in the action. Giltner, Inc. v. Idaho Dept. of Commerce and Labor, 
145 Idaho 415 (2008). If the court determines that the patty requesting attorney's fees prevailed, 
OPINION, DECISION, AND ORDER ON MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES Page 3 
152 
the court must then determine whether the losing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or 
law. SEIZ Canst., L.L.C v. Idaho State University, 140 Idaho 8 (2004). 
III. 
ANALYSIS 
Respondent alleges that Petitioner appealed the Commission's decision without 
reasonable basis in fact or law and that Respondent is therefore due reasonable costs and fees 
under I.C. § 12-117. Petitioner argues that he sought judicial review based on debatable law; 
Petitioner also argues that Respondent's motion for attorney's fees was untimely. 
A. Respondent's Motion was Timely Filed 
Petitioner contends that Respondent's motion was not timely filed. I.R.C.P. 54(d)(5) 
allows a party to submit a memorandum of costs, "but such memorandum of costs may not be 
filed later than fourteen (14) days after entry of judgment." This court's order on Petitioner's 
motion to reconsider was entered on June 1, 2009. Respondent did not file its motion for 
attorney's fees until June 23, 2009, well after fourteen days had passed from the entry of 
judgment. 
Respondent argues that the proper date to consider for purposes of LR.C.P. 54 is not June 
23,2009, but rather February 10,2009, the date when it filed its original motion for attorney's 
fees, eight days after the original order in this case. Respondent contends that this motion, filed 
in February, was timely filed under Rule 54(d)(5). 
In the alternative, Respondent urges this court to consider the February motion for fees 
prematurely filed. Rule 54(d)(5) provides that "[a] memorandum of costs prematurely filed shall 
be considered as timely." This change to Rule 54(d)(5) formalized the holding in Crowley v. 
Lafayette Life Ins. Co., 106 Idaho 818, 822-23 (1984). In Crowley, the Idaho Supreme Court 
held "that the premature filing of the memorandum of costs in this case does not constitute a 
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ground for striking the memorandum of costs" because the court could "conceive of no prejudice 
to any party which would result from considering a memorandum of costs filed prior to a 
decision of the court." ld. at 823. Similarly, here, this court can think of no prejudice to 
Petitioner resulting from considering Respondent's motion filed and answered to in February. 
Additionally, in Ada County Highway Dist. By and Through Fairbanks v. Acarrequi, 105 
Idaho 873, 875 (1983), the Idaho Supreme Court held that the time periods under Rule 54 may 
be enlarged at the discretion of the trial court (citing Wheeler v. Mclntyre, 100 Idaho 286 
(1979». 
Under any standard contemplated by the Idaho Rules or the Idaho Supreme Court, 
Respondent's motion for attorney's fees was timely filed and is properly before this court. 
B. Respondent was the Prevailing Party 
Petitioner urges the court to reject Respondent's petition on the grounds that there was no 
prevailing party in this case. This court did not directly consider the county commissioners' 
decision, but instead held that I.e. 67-5279(4) did not allow Petitioner the ability to seekjudicial 
review as "agency action shall be affirmed unless substantial rights of the appellant have been 
prejudiced" and Petitioner could point to no substantial rights affected by the commissioners' 
decision. Petitioner contends that this COUlt dismissed the petition for judicial review on 
jurisdictional grounds, and therefore there is no prevailing party. 
To support this argument, Petitioner relies on an Idaho Supreme Court opinion that has 
since been withdrawn, Burns Holdings, LLC v. A1adison County Bd. of County Comm 'rs, 2009 
WL 1163405 (May 1,2009, July 9, 2009)(Opinion Amended and Superseded by Burns Holdings, 
LLC v. Madison County Bd. of County C01lll1l'rS, 2009 WL 1959498 (Idaho Jul 09, 2009). In 
Burns Holdings, the COUli ultimately upheld a district court's determination that, where it lacked 
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jurisdiction to hear a challenge to the county commission's amendment of a comprehensive plan, 
there was no prevailing party. 
Here, unlike in Burns Holdings, this court has jurisdiction to review decisions made by 
the county commissioners regarding the granting of variances under the Local Land Use 
PlaIming Act. This court determined that, although Respondent fit the criteria of an affected 
party under the LLUPA in I.C. §67-6521(a), he did not meet the requirement of the APA in I.C. 
67-5279(4) that his substantial rights be prejudiced. This court has jurisdiction to hear the 
petition; the deficiency lay in Petitioner's appeal under the requirements of the AP A, not the 
nature ofthe commissioners' decision. The Burns Holdings opinion is inapplicable to this case. 
Respondent prevailed in this matter. 
C. Petitioner Acted with a Reasonable Basis 
Respondent argues that Petitioner filed his petition for judicial reView without a 
reasonable basis in law or fact. Petitioner argues that this case involved a good-faith argument 
on issues of first impression in Idaho and therefore costs are inappropriate. 
This cOlui's decision relied primarily on I. C. 67 -5279(4), which reqUIres that, 
"Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this section, agency action shall be 
affirmed unless substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced." This court determined 
that the commissioners' decision to allow construction on property accessible only by crossing 
an existing easement across Petitioner's land did not prejudice Petitioner's substantial rights. 
The parties did not provide-nor could this court find-an appellate decision defining a violation 
of substantial rights in an applicable situation. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has stated unequivocally that "A party is not entitled to 
attorney's fees if the issue is one of first impression in Idaho." Lane Ranch Partnership v. City of 
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Sun Valley, 45 Idaho 87, 91 (2007)(citing Sh.I Z Canst., L.L.C v. Idaho State University, 140 
Idaho 8, 14, (2004)). Respondent may argue that there are many Idaho cases construing the 
"substantial rights" requirement, and that this issue is not one of first impression. Though this 
court simply applied the plain meaning of the statue requiring the prejudicing of substantial 
rights, there are no appellate cases construing the statute in a similar situation. 
Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has refused to grant attorney's fees in cases where 
the losing paliy "raised legitimate issues" in cases dealing with well-settled law. Cantwell v. City 
of Boise, 146 Idaho 127, 131 (2008). Here, Petitioner raised legitimate issues concerning 
Respondent's decision to allow his neighbors to construct buildings on lots that he believed did 
not meet zoning requirements. Petitioner clearly met the "affected persons" requirement of the 
LLUPA, but this court could not provide any remedy under the APA and therefore dismissed his 
petition. 
Petitioner' s appeal, while ultimately failing to state a violation of his substantial rights, 
presented a legitimate issue to this court and was not fri volous or unreasonable. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent's Motion for Attorney's Fees is DENIED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this -f day of August, 2009. 
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